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I. ABSTRACT 
I. Lands subject to state claims of ownership did exist prior to 
to 1938 in what is now known as the Back Bay National Wildlife 
Refuge. The origins of state claims are varied: 
A. A strip of state land known as a commons ran along the entire_ 
length of the Refuge beach extending 907 feet above the high water 
mark and was entered into public record in the late 1860's. There 
is no record of this land ever being lawfully conveyed. Deeds 
and other records making references to public lands or commons in 
this area date back to 1621. 
B. A grant along the seashore appears to have been made after the 
passage of state legislation precluding the grant of the shores 
of the sea after 1873. (Approximately one-fourth of the Refuge 
beachfront was conveyed after 1873.) 
C. Large areas of the Refuge were ungranted state lands at 
the time of the condemnation. The northern three-fourths of the 
Refuge beach and most of the inland portion of the barrier beach 
associated with it appear to fall within this category and comprise 
more than 1,046 acres. 
D. A small marsh island of eight acres was conveyed after 
the passage 0£ an 1888 statute prohibiting the grantinq of marshes 
on the eastern shore of Virginia (Emphasis added. The Act as 
originally enacted did not capitalize the words ea~tern shore. 
Code revisors first capitalized the words in 1948.) 
II. Although Federal Condemnation operates in rem and would as a 
general rule vest valid title in the federal government, 
A. Proper notice to potential claimants is required; and 
B. Under the federal Migratory Bird Conservation Act state 
consent is required. 
III. Based on analysis of the federal Migratory Bird Conservation 
Act of 1929 and state statutes, Virginia consented to the condemna-
tion of private and corporate lands but not state lands. 
IV. Research indicates that the federal government's title search 
produced evidence of potential state claims within the Refuge re-
quiring the state be given notice as an adversary party in the 
condemnation proceedings. 
V. Virginia was not given required notice. 
VI. A. The federal government in the condemnation suit in 1938 either 
deliberately or through a higher order of negligence masked a state 
claim to 1,046 acres of what appears to be ungranted state land 
at the time of the condemnation by taking much smaller privately 
owned tracts located elsewhere in the area and depicting them as 
occupying the 1,046 acre area subject to state claim. 
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B. Other lands were subject to state claim by virtue of being 
(1) state owned commons or by being (2) seashores protected from 
grant by the Virginia statute of 1873 or by being (3) marshes 
possibly protected from grant by the Virginia statute of 1888. 
VII. The state may argue that: 
A. The state granted consent only to the taking of private and 
corporate lands under the state consent statutes of 1930, 1936 
and 1938 thereby rendering the condemnation invalid as to 
state land and/or 
B. Regardless of consent the title examination records of the 
federal government disclose potential state claims triggering 
a due process requirement to notify the state of such claims 
in the condemnation proceedings. (!)Negligent omission of this 
duty would lead to a just compensation award to the state. (2) 
Fraudulent omission of this duty would at least lead to the 
condemnation being invalid as to state lands. 
VIII. Other potential arguments have been assessed and found lacking: 
A. Prescriptive Easement, 
B. Implied Dedication, 
C. Public Trust, 
D. Custom. 
IX. Potential defenses either present no barrier to state claims or 
can be countered by reasonable arguments. 
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III. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1970's the Department of Ocean and Coastal 
Law at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, the School of 
Marine Science of the College of William and Mary has been 
carrying out research into the nature of private and public 
rights and ownership of riparian, subaqueous and coastal lands; 
Smolen, Theodore F. "Historical Overview of Lands Known as 
Common", Virginia Institute of Marine Science, 1974; Theberge, N. 
B., 1975. "An Investigation into the History and Ownership of 
Starling's Island", Virginia Institute of Marine Science,prepared 
pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution No. 153; Theberge, N. B., 1976. 
"An Investigation into the History and Ownership of Adam's Island", 
Virginia Institute of Marine Science, prepared pursuant to Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 57. Evidence, information, and theories 
resulting from departmental research have found its way into 
litigation and legislation. Coupland v. Morton, 7 ERC 1965 (1975); 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. The Nature Conservancy and Bradford, 
Record No. 79-1320; Public Beach Conservation and Development Act, 
Va. Code Ann. § 10-215 et seq. (1978 Repl. Vol.). On the basis of 
our past association with questions pertaining to governmental, 
private and public rights in coastal lands, we were requested to 
examine state law, federal law, and the history of state, private and 
federal ownership in the area of the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge 
(Appendix 1, Figure 1) in order to determine what rights of public 
access might exist in this area. 
8 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. COMMONS CONCEPTS 
Although commons concepts developed independently in many 
cultures, the origins of the commons concepts embodied in Virginia· law 
can be traced to England. In cultures of Germanic peoples such as the 
Angles and the Saxons who inhabited England, common property and 
common rights were well known. The Roman conquerors of these 
peoples also accepted the concepts of common property and common 
rights. Under Roman civil law at the time of Emperor Justinian, 
438 - 565 A.D., no one was forbidden access to the seashore. An 
interesting parallel existed between early Roman civil law of the 
fifth and sixth centuries and pronouncements made by the Privy 
Council and the House of Commons regarding the rights to the shores 
of the sea in the new colony of Virginia in the seventeenth century 
(1621). In Justinian's time, public use of the seashore was 
recognized as a part of the "law of nations" and certain rights such 
as hauling nets and drying them rights that could only be exercised 
on lands above the ebb and flow of the tide -- were codified. 
Seventeenth century English statements are strikingly similar to 
the Roman espression of rights above the ebb and flow of the tide 
existing in Justinian's time. The pronouncements of the Privy 
Council and Parliament referred to public rights in the shores of 
the sea to haul nets, boats, collect wood, build fires and carry 
out other activities associated with fishing. 
The Norman conquest of England in 1066 A.D., introduced 
significant changes in concepts of property ownership. Under 
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the Normans the sovereign owned all land and lesser individuals 
held land only with the sovereign's acquiescence. It is unclear 
how Germanic tribal customs, Roman civil law and Norman concepts 
may have affected the evolution of commons. The signing of the 
Magna Carta, however, in 1215 gave some indication that the rights 
to the shores were a source of conflict less than 150 years after 
the Norman conquest. Prior to the Magna Carta, English Kings 
had exercised the rights to grant exclusive fisheries in tidal 
areas. The Magna Carta assured greater recognition of public rights 
in such areas. J. Angell, The Rights of Property in Tide Water and 
in the Soil and Shores Thereof, pp. 23-25, (2d. ed., 1847). 
Inherent to the commons concept, is the problem of private 
usurpation of such lands or rights. This has been a problem of 
long standing in Great Britain and only recently was a Royal 
Commission appointed to deal with the loss of common lands and 
common rights. Virginia shares not only the legal inheritance of 
the commons concepts but also the problems attendant to those 
concepts. 
Commons in Virginia are state owned lands subject to certain 
common rights. (They may also be private lands over which are imposed 
certain common rights Appendix 2.) State owned lands which were 
specifically declared to be common may exist within the Back Bay 
National Wildlife Refuge. Evidence of commons can be found early 
in the Colonial period (Appendix 3). In April of 1621 
the House of Commons in England passed an "Act for the Freer 
Liberty of Fishing" addressing conflicts over fishing 
rights off the coasts of Newfoundland, New England and Virginia. 
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This act sets forth the rights of "his majesties subjects" to 
freely use the sea shore of the aforementioned places for the 
purposes of taking, drying, salting and otherwise processing fish, 
gathering of wood for fuel and repairs, and for the purposes of 
performing any other activities necessary for the maintenance of 
their fishery operations. 
In June of 1621 the Privy Council of England issued a similar 
statement regarding freedom of fishing. In this document the Council 
ordered that "the people of the Colonies ..• should have freedom 
of the shore for drying of their nets, and taking and saving of 
their fish and to have wood for their necessary uses .... " 
These documents establish at an early date that the shore lands in 
the Colonies of Newfoundland, New England and Virginia were to be 
used as a corrunon. 
About 1770 a petition was filed with the President of the 
Colony of Virginia requesting that certain lands along the Atlantic 
Beaches of Princess Anne County be withheld from grant as these 
lands comprised a corrunons. The petition stated" ... for many 
years past a Corrunon Fishery hath been carried on by many of the 
Inhabitants of said county and others on the Shore of the Ocean 
and Bay aforesaid .... " J. Wharton, The Bounty of The Chesapeake, 
p. 50, (1957). Apparently in response to such concerns the new 
government drafted an act in 1780 which protectE~d from any future 
grants those "unappropriated lands on the bay, sea and river shores, 
in the eastern parts of this commonwealth [which] have been 
heretofore reserved as a corrunon to all the citizens thereof. II 
10 Bening 226. (Appendix 4). The lands along the Atlantic 
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shoreline in Princess Anne County were apparently protected from 
grant by the 1780 act. 
In 1867, J.P. Hale applied for grants to four tracts of land 
comprising the barrier beach in Princess Anne County. These tracts 
totaled over 9,000 acres extending from the North Carolina line 
to Cape Henry including the area which is now the entire Atlantic 
shore of the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge. When the 
application for these lands was received, the County Clerk noted 
the common nature of the shore lands in this area. The Clerk 
stated in one document that any grant for the land requested 
was to exclude "all fishing shores and privileges which were 
reserved as a common to all the people of the state by the Act 
of 1780 •... " Surveyor's Book, Princess Anne County, 1850-1904. 
In another document that referred specifically to the shore land 
now comprised within the limits of the Back Bay National Wildlife 
Refuge the Clerk states that any grant "is not intended to include 
the fishing shores which are reserved as a common to all of the 
people of the state .... " Surveyor's Book, Princess Anne County, 
1850-1904. As a result, the accompanying surveys demonstrate 
in graphic detail what was considered to be the common shore lands 
in l869. The shoreline strip of common land is shown to extend 
13 chains, 75 links, or 907 feet landward of "ordinary high water 
mark". This strip runs parallel to the high water mark and 
includes what is now the Atlantic shoreline of the Back Bay 
National Wildlife Refuge. (Appendix 1, Figure 2). 
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Hale's application for a grant to these lands was never 
finalized. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Atlantic shore lands 
within the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge were a common of long 
standing and that the 1780 Act was indeed utilized to protect these 
lands from grant. After the War Between the States, the Act of 1780 
was repealed by legislation enacted in 1866. By virtue of that 
legislation common lands and any other state land could be legally 
conveyed until this legislation was repealed in 1873. However, none 
of the common lands within the refuge were ever granted during this 
period. 
In April of 1873, the General Assembly passed an act which states 
that "all the beds of the bays, rivers and creE~ks, and the shores 
of the sea within this Commonwealth and not conveyed by special 
grant or compact according to law, shall continue and remain the 
property.of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and may be used as a 
common by all the people of the state for the purposes of fishing 
and fowling and taking and catching of oysters and other shellfish." 
(Appendix 5). This statute exists at Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-1 (1973 
Repl. Vol. ) • 
At least as late as 1887 a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
review of the fisheries of the United States indicated that the 
Atlantic shores of Princess Anne County were still maintained as 
a fishery. 
In 1888, the General Assembly passed an act to prevent the 
granting of unappropriated marsh or meadow lands on the eastern 
shore of Virginia. Apparently this Act was necessary to further 
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clarify the language found in the 1873 Act as it states that: 
"all unappropriated marsh or meadow lands lying on the eastern 
shore of Virginia, which have remained ungranted, and which have 
been used as a common by the people of this state, shall continue 
as such common, shall remain ungranted, and no land warrant shall 
be located upon the same. That any of the people of this state 
may fish, fowl, or hunt on any such marsh or meadow lands." 
(Appendix 6). The text of the 1888 act presently exists in 
the Va. Code Ann. § 41.1-4 (1981 Repl. Vol.). However, contrary 
to the original legislation, the present Code contains the phrase 
"eastern shore" in a capitalized form. This change was the result 
of work done by Code revisors in 1948 and not by legislative 
action. Therefore, the 1888 legislation may apply to all marshes 
on the eastern seaboard of Virginia rather than only to those in 
Accomack and Northampton Counties. 
The commons doctrine occupies an important position with 
respect to the title to the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge. 
By virtue of the operation of statutes and the common law, the 
State of Virginia may have been the owner of land in Back Bay at 
the time of the 1938 condemnation. The significance of this 
doctrine will be more apparent in the title analysis which follows. 
B. TITLE 
1. Princess Anne Club Tract 
a) Colonial Grants and Early Conveyances, 1647-1858: 
The Princess Anne Club Tract as condemned by the United States 
in 1938 totaled 3,113.52 acres of land. The club tract was comprised 
of three land areas: Long Island, Little Island and the seaboard 
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tract. These lands were originally granted to individuals during 
the late 17th and early 18th centuries. 
(i) Long Island 
Long Island is situated in Back Bay. It contains 1,167 acres 
and is comprised of high lands, marsh lands and islands. It is 
bordered on the north by Shipp's Bay; on the west by the Great 
Narrows and Red Head Bay; on the south by Little Narrows; and on 
the east by the waters of Buck Island Bay which separates Long 
Island from the seaboard tract. 
The Long Island tract was in continuous private ownership from 
colonial grants to the time of the condemnation in 1938. There are 
acreage discrepancies from conveyance to conveyance and numerous 
chains of title end. Differences in the total acreage estimates 
of Long Island vary from 1,381 acres (colonial land grants), to 
1,545 acres (acquisitions by Edgar Burroughs), and finally to 
1,167 acres (1938 federal condemnation). This can only be explained 
by assuming that prior to the condemnation in 1938, surveys of 
Long Island inaccurately estimated acreage totals. An examination 
of the land descriptions in the grants and deeds to Long Island 
prior to 1938 leave no doubt that they are the same lands 
described in the condemnation proceedings. 
The entirety of Long Island by 1858 was owned by Edgar 
Burroughs, a County Conunissioner for Princess Anne County. 
(ii) Little Island 
Located in Back Bay, Little Island contains 200 acres of land 
and marshes situated between Long Island and the Atlantic Ocean. 
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Although once an island, it is now physically a part of the 
seaboard tract. Because its title devolves along a separate and 
distinct chain of title from that of the remainder of the seaboard 
tract, Little Island is abstracted separately. Both Little 
Island and the seaboard tract have the same beginning in ownership 
under Edward Lamount around the year 1700. An unbroken chain of 
title exists for the 200 acres of Little Island beginning with 
Edward Lamount's conveyance to Lewis Conner (1,775 acres of the 
seaboard tract in 1708) through the possession by Edgar Burroughs 
in 1853. 
Today, this tract no longer carries the name of Little Island. 
Rather, reference to Little Island is found north of the Back Bay 
National Wildlife Refuge on the seaboard side and pertains to the 
Little Island Life Saving Station. No information exists in the 
title abstract that related the Life Saving Station to the 200 acres 
of island marsh owned by Edgar Burroughs in 1853. 
(iii) The Seaboard Tract 
The seaboard tract is that strip of land bordered on the east 
by the Atlantic Ocean on the west by the waters of Buck Island Bay 
and Back Bay. Ownership of this tract began in the late 17th 
century through colonial grants issued by the Governor of Virginia. 
These grants are referenced in the 1708 Edward Lamount to Lewis 
Conner deed of 1,775 acres of the seaboard tract. The Lamount/ 
Conner deed describes the southern boundary of the tract as 
bordering on the land patented by John Fulcher from the Governor 
of Virginia. The Fulcher border is slightly northeast of the 
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northern tip of Ragged Island; therefore, the adjacent Lamount/ 
Conner tract contains the entire seaboard tract of the Wildlife 
Refuge. 
Title to this 1,775 acres of land was quickly divided among 
many individuals. 
inexplicably ended. 
By 1800, however, most of the chains of title 
Except for the Little Island tract of 200 
acres which can be traced back to Edward Lamount, there is no 
other land in the seaboard tract from the Lamount/Conner deed which 
can be traced to Edgar Burroughs, or any other individual in the 
1850's. 
The discontinuity in title to the seaboard tract has been 
verified by the records of the 1938 condemnation. Among these 
records is the title abstract compiled in 1938 by James Mills 
of the Virginia Title and Mortgage Corporation. This abstract 
contains no record of title to the seaboard tract after the very 
early 1800's. 
Any attempt to explain why the chains of tit.le to the seaboard 
tract disappeared is largely supposition. One plausible theory 
involves a Virginia Act of Assembly passed in Ma.y of 1779 entitled 
An act concerning escheats and forfeitures from British subjects. 
10 Hening's Statutes at Large 66, 1779-1881. This act provided 
that all property, real and personal, which belonged to any 
British subject at the time of its enactment would be vested in 
the Commonwealth by way of escheat. There is evidence that at 
least one of th~ landowners of the seaboard tract was a British 
subject from Liverpool, England. In light of the low dollar value 
of the lands in Back Bay and the anti-British sentiment at that time, 
many landowners may simply have abandoned their land. 
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From the landmar:.: case of Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), it is apparent that this Act 
was used often and validly between its enactment in 1779 and the 
signing of the Jay Trecty in 1794. The Jay Treaty confirmed the 
titles of British subjects owning land in Virginia at the time of 
its signing. The full e}fect of the treaty on the Virginia 
statute was not immediately apparent, however, as evidenced by the 
need for the Fairfax rulir~ in 1813. 
Regardless of why the title ended, there is no doubt that the 
State of Virginia acquired ownership by virtue of an automatic 
forfeiture of the lands for non-payment of taxes. The earliest 
Virginia statute on the subjE:·ct appears to be a 1790 Act which 
declared lands to be forfeited absolutely for non-payment of taxes. 
This Act, passed on December 27, 1790 (Sess. Acts of 179'0, Ch .. 5 § 1) 
§ 1) declared if the tax on any tract of land should not be paid 
for the space of three years, the right of such lands should be 
forfeited and title vested in the Commonwealth. 
Although the procedures of forfeiture underwent some slight 
modifications, the basic statute remained in effect until repealed 
by an Act of February 9, 1814 (2 Rev. Code 1819, p. 555). The Act 
repealed all forfeiture statutes and made it possible for land 
previously forfeited to be reclaimed. No forfeiture could have 
occurred until the passage of the Act in 1835. Levasser v. Washburn, 
52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 572 (1854). The 1835 Act was interpreted by the 
court in Levasser: 
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The act ... declaring that lands which had 
been omitted from the books of the commissioners 
of the revenue should be forfeited unless the 
owners should cause the same to be entered and 
charged with taxes, and should pay the same except 
such as might be released by law, was intended by its 
own force and energy to render the forfeiture 
absolute and complete, without the necessity of any 
inquisition, judicial proceeding or finding of any kind 
in order to consununate it. It was perfectly within the 
competence of the legislature to declare such forfeiture 
and divest the title by the mere operation of the act 
itself, and the whole legislation upon the subject of 
delinquent and forfeited lands plainly manifests the 
intention to exercise its power in this form. Id. at 581. 
An Act in March 1836 (Session Acts, p. 7) provided additional 
time, until November 1, 1836, to comply with the provisions of the 
February 27, 1835 Act. This was the time requirement for owners 
of omitted lands to enter those lands on the books. If the owners 
failed to comply, the forfeiture became absolute from and after 
November 1, 1836. 
The Virginia courts construed these statutes as making the 
forfeiture complete as of November 1, 1836, and as requiring no 
judicial proceedings of any kind to consummate such forfeiture. 
Lennig v. White, 1 Va. 873, 20 S.E. 831 (1894); Wild's Lessee v. 
Serpell, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 405 (1853); Staats v. Board, 51 Va. 
(10 Gratt.) 400 (1853); Usher's v. Pride, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 190 
(1858). As late as 1898 the Virginia Supreme Court in a case 
involving omitted lands reaffirmed that: 
the forfeiture becomes absolute and complete by the 
failure to enter the lands upon the books of the 
commissioner of the revenue, and to pay the taxes, etc. 
in the manner prescribed by the Act of February 27, 
1835, and that no judgment or decree, inquest of office 
or other matter of record, is necessary to consummate and 
perfect the forfeiture. 
Matney v. Ratcliff, 96 Va. 231, 235 (1898). 
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Unfortunately, records of forfeiture and escheat were rarely 
kept. It is therefore impossible to identify the exact date when 
the land in this chain was forfeited. Nevertheless, Virginia 
eventually became the owner of the land in this chain of title. 
Virginia had gr~nted these lands in the 1600's and again in the 
late 1800's. This could only have occurred by escheat to the state 
in the interim period. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that during 
the 18th and 19th centuries the State of Virginia obtained title 
to the entire seaboard tract that lies within the Wildlife Refuge, 
with the exception of Little Island. Private ownership of Little 
Island was uninterrupted from the colonial grants to the 1938 
ownership by the Princess Anne Club. 
b) Later Conveyances, 1858-1938 
(i) Long Island, Little Island, Seaboard Tract 
By 1858 Edgar Burroughs held title to the lands of Long Island 
and Little Island. Using the acreage totals determined by the survey 
used in the 1938 condemnation proceedings, Edgar Burroughs owned 
1,367 acres of land on Long Island and Little Island. In contrast, 
acreage in the deeds to the tracts of land held by Edgar Burroughs 
totaled 1,745 acres. Acreage estimates used during the period of 
the 1850's through the early 1900's by those claiming ownership to 
lands later condemned in Back Bay are therefore highly suspect. 
What they may indicate, however, are attempts to conceal unlawful 
acquisitions of lands on the seaboard tract by eastward expansion 
of valid title on Long Island and Little Island. Title examination 
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reveals that Edgar Burroughs had no interest in any lands on the 
seaboard tract other than the 200 acre Little Island tract. There 
are no conveyances or grants to Edgar Burroughs which would have 
given him title to other land on the seaboard tract. Furthermore, 
the descriptions of the deeds to lands on Long Island and Little 
Island show that his interests on the seaboard tract were limited 
to Little Island. 
In 1866, John J. Burroughs, executor of the estate of 
Edgar Burroughs, sold to Benjamin Wood "all thosE~ several tracts 
and parcels of land, marshes and sand beach known by the name of 
'Long Island' and 'Little Island' hereinbefore described containing 
in the whole about nineteen hundred acres." Deed Book 48, page 283. 
Though the acreage total had increased to 1,900 acres, Benjamin 
Wood's interest is limited to Long Island and Little Island. 
(Appendix 1, Figure 3). Ten years later in 1876 Benjamin Wood 
sold his interest in the lands of Back Bay. In the intervening 
years of 1866 through 1876, Wood unsuccessfully attempted to 
purchase the lands of the seaboard tract from the Board of Public 
Works of the Conunonwealth of Virginia. 
Robert E. Nash, who had been earlier conunissioned in 1866 
by the Board of Public Works of Virginia to surv,ey all waste 
and unappropriated lands in Back Bay, represented Benjamin Wood 
before the Board of Public Works. On four occasions during the 
year of 1870, Nash petitioned the Board to approve "the purchase 
of certain state land for the Hon. Benj. Wood". (Emphasis added). 
Letter of July 5, 1870, from Nash to Board of Public Works. Nash 
went on to describe the land he wished to purchase for Wood in his 
letter to the Board; 
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Beginning at a place known as 'Sand Bridge' which 
is about five miles southwardly from Rudee and running 
along the Ocean line of the state survey southwardly 
to the ... N. Carolina line, thence along said 
Carolina line West to Back Bay, thence North Westwardly 
along said Bay and the line of the state survey to the 
Sand Bridge road to the Beginning supposed to contain 
six hundred acres. 
Nash offered $600 to the Board for this seaboard tract as agent for 
Wood. (Nash had earlier estimated this same area to contain 6,000 
acres which closely approximates the actual acreage today.) 
On July 28, 1870, Nash petitioned Mr. DeWitt, Secretary 
of the Board of Public Works, to gain approval for a purchase of 
what he now estimated to be 650 acres for the benefit of Benjamin 
Wood. Nash offered $650 and stated that though he "thought it 
better the Board should retain possession of this land to go with 
Back Bay," (emphasis added) the land was of little value and the 
state would benefit more by the sale. 
On September 10, 1870, W. w. Forbes, an agent of Benjamin Wood, 
petitioned the Board of Public Works to sell "a certain quantity 
of land lying in Back Bay, which belongs to the State of Virginia. 
I offer 650 dollars, estimating the quantity of land to be 650 acres." 
(Emphasis added). 
The letters to the Board of Public Works during 1870 
unquestionably indicate state ownership of the seaboard tract. In 
addition, a survey of the waste and unappropriated lands in Back 
Bay prepared in 1867 by Robert Nash, official surveyor for the Board 
of Public Works, certified the State of Virginia's ownership of the 
seaboard tract. Documents based on the Nash survey were officially 
certified in 1871 by the Princess Anne County Clerk, the Magistrate 
for the City of Norfolk and the Surveyor for Princess Anne County. 
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Despite the efforts of Nash and Forbes, Benjamin Wood was 
never able to purchase these lands from the State of Virginia. 
In 1876 Benjamin Wood conveyed his 1,900 acres of Long Island 
and Little Island to Jacob Travis, stating that it is "the same 
premises conveyed by John J. Burroughs, Executor of Edgar Burroughs, 
to said Benjamin Wood." Deed Book 52, page 280. However, 
in the deed to Travis, the description encompassed more than the 
tract conveyed by Burroughs to Wood. It now included the area which 
begins on the Atlantic Ocean, runs due west to the northern tip of 
Long Island, follows the Great Narrows and the Little Narrows 
to the southern tip of Long Island, and then proceeds due east to 
the Atlantic Ocean. Wood sold not only Long Island and Little 
Island (Appendix 1, Figure 3), but also the entirety of the 
seaboard tract which lay east of Long Island without ever having 
these lands validly conveyed to him. (Appendix 1, Figure 4). 
Wood had received compensation for an additional 1,046 acres to 
which he had no title. 
Princess Anne Club acreage condemned in 1938 
less 1911 Barbour conveyance to Princess Anne 
Club 
Total acreage Wood conveyed to Travis 
less actual acreage owned by Wood 
Ungranted state lands claimed by the Princess 
Anne Club at the time of the condemnation 
3,113 acres 
700 acres 
2,413 acres 
- 1,367 acres 
1,046 acres 
In 1894 Travis sold this "1,900 acre" tract (in actuality 
containing 3,113 acres) to the Kimballs who in 1896 conveyed the 
same land to the Princess Anne Club. Throughout these conveyances, 
the same acreage total of 1,900 acres was used to refer to the 
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three tracts (Long Island, Little Island, Seaboard Tract). Also, 
the identical description used by Wood in his conveyance to Travis 
in 1876 was used in these subsequent conveyances (described as 
encompassing the lands from the Atlantic Ocean, to the Great 
Narrows, to the Little Narrows and back to the Atlantic Ocean). 
Reviewing the land assessment figures for the Princess Anne 
Club as contained in the Virginia Beach Land Books (see following 
exhibit) demonstrates that the land acreage totals were incorrect. 
From the period of 1903 to 1914, the Princess Anne Club was 
assessed with 1,900 acres on "Long Island". In 1914 when the 
Princess Anne Club acquired 700 acres from William Barbour, the 
700 acres were referred to as "Back Bay". This land assessment 
remained essentially the same through 1926. At that time the land 
descriptions were changed to Little Island and Long Island; 
however, the acreage totals were not changed. The tax advantage 
that the Princess Anne Club enjoyed by the acreage discrepancy is 
apparent. But furthermore, the 1926 change effectively concealed 
the earlier loss of Virginia's property rights on the seaboard 
tract. The land ownership of the seaboard tract was labeled 
as "Little Island", which is the small 200 acre area on that tract, 
where in reality the Princess Anne Club occupied an additional 
1,046 acres on that seaboard tract. 
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EXHIBIT 
Virginia Beach Land Books Tax Assessment 
* changes bearing 
from 
courthouse miles 
1903 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres S.E. 14 
1903 Wm. Barbour & Back Bay 1,400 acres S.E. 18 
Geo. Tenney 
1910 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres S.E. 14 
1910 Wm. Barbour & Back Bay 1,400 acres S.E. 18 
Geo. Tenney 
* 1914 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres s. 15 
P.A. Club Back Bay 700 acres S.E. 20 
1914 J.E. Barbour Back Bay 700 acres S.E. 20 
1916 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 700 acres 
1917 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 700 acres 
* 1918 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 694 acres 
1919 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 694 acres 
1920 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 694 acres 
1921 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 694 acres 
1922 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 694 acres 
1923 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 694 acres 
1924 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 694 acres 
1925 P.A. Club Long Island 1,900 acres 
Back Bay 694 acres 
* 1926 P.A. Club Little Island 419 acres 
Little Island 1,481 acres 
Long Island 694 acres 
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EXHIBIT (continued) 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
Remains Unchanged 
According the the Land Books in Princess Anne County, the 
Princess Anne Club owned 1,900 acres as "Long Island" in 1910. 
In the same year William Barbour is assessed with 1,400 acres 
as "Back Bay", bearing southeast, 18 miles from the courthouse. 
It is known that this 1,400 acres is on the seaboard tract, with the 
upper half being within the Refuge. 
According to the Deed Books in Princess Anne County, William 
Barbour and J.E. Barbour agreed to a partition of the 1,400 acres in 
1911. William Barbour took the northern 700 acres, J.E. took the 
southern half. In the same year William Barbour sold.his 700 acres 
to the Princess Anne Club (P.A. Club). 
The Land Books of 1914 reflect these transactions. The Princess 
Anne Club is assessed with 1,900 acres as "Long Island" and with 
700 acres as "Back Bay". The 700 acres bears southeast 20 miles from 
the courthouse. William Barbour is no longer a land owner in this 
district and J.E. Barbour has 700 acres as "Back Bay". J.E. 
Barbour's land bears southeast 20 miles from the courthouse. 
It is, therefore, evident that the 700 acres assessed to the 
Princess Anne Club in 1914 is the same 700 acres previously owned 
by William Barbour and not part of the tract, further north, which 
the Princess Anne Club acquired from Laura Kimball. 
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2. The Barbour Hill Tract 
The Barbour Hill Tract was located on the oceanfront barrier 
beach partially within the area condemned for the Back Bay 
National Wildlife Refuge. It was bounded on the east by the 
Atlantic Ocean, west by Back Bay, north by a line due east from 
the Little Narrows,and south by land granted to Otis Ewell. 
This tract was comprised of three separate Virginia land grants, 
all made after 1873. According to the original grants these 
parcels contained 278.2 acres in all. 
The earliest grant was made to George W. Dawley on May 8, 
1880. This grant was said to involve 195 acres bounded on the 
east by a narrow strip of "sand land" and on the west by Back Bay. 
(Appendix 1, Figure 8). 
The second grant was made to James M. Malbone, et al. on 
August 26, 1885. This grant was said to involve an 82-acre parcel 
adjoining Dawley's grant to the east. The land in the Malbone, 
et al. tract therefore represented the narrow strip of "sand land'! 
described above, and was described as "lying on the Atlantic 
Ocean." (Appendix 1, Figure 8). 
William Barbour acquired three-fourths interest in the Dawley 
and Malbone, et al. tracts by 1900. He then received the third 
grant along with George W. Tenney on March 14, 1902. This grant 
involved only 1.2 acres bordering Back Bay on the west. 
Although the sum total of the grants was said to involve only 
278.2 acres, William Barbour conveyed an interest in the same lands 
as 1,300 acres in May of 1902. His count·was much more accurate 
than the 278.2 figure. The Malbone, et al. pa.rc1el, for example, 
contained at least three times the acreage reported in the grant. 
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In 1909, William Barbour, et al. recorded a dividing line 
agreement made with the Princess Anne Club, owners of property 
to the north. The parties to the agreement set Barbour's northern 
boundary as a line running east from Little Narrows to the Atlantic 
Ocean. In November of 1911 William Barbour and John E. Barbour re-
corded a partition agreement dividing the Barbour Hill Tract in 
half, east to west. John took the southern portion and William 
took the northern part. 
William Barbour sold his portion to the Princess Anne Club 
in December of 1911. (The club then acquired the remaining 
one-fourth interest in 1938 from the heirs of George Tenney). 
This portion was later condemned by the United States. The 
partition line between William and John Barbour's land therefore 
formed part of the southern boundary of the Wildlife Refuge. 
It is impossible to determine the actual acreage of the 
condemned portion using only the deeds of conveyance. The 1911 
Barbour/Princess Anne Club conveyance does, however, allow for a 
reasonable approximation. Barbour conveyed 6,646 feet of oceanfront 
to the Princess Anne Club. By using this length measurement and 
estimating the width by scale, the northern end appears to be 
about 5,000 feet wide extending from the Atlantic Ocean to Back 
Bay. This calculation results in an acreage total of between 
700 and 750 acres in the portion condemned. This figure is 
verified by the tax assessment books in the Clerk's Office of 
Virginia Beach. William Barbour was assessed with 700 acres in 
Back Bay after the 1911 partition. 
28 
The discrepancy between the state's total acreage (278.2) 
in the grants and the actual acreage (1,400) cannot be explained 
by the information available. Despite the growth in acreage totals 
the descriptions remain the same throughout the chain of title. 
Therefore, the three grants (Malbone, et al., Dawley, Barbour) 
made by the State of Virginia comprised the land that William 
Barbour eventually acquired. 
There are some serious problems with the title to the Barbour 
Hill Tract. The "82 acre" grant to James M. Malbone, et al. 
in 1885 appears to have been in violation of the 1873 statute. 
(Appendix 1, Figure 5). According to that statute, "all the beds 
of the bays, rivers and creeks, and the shores of the sea" within 
the State of Virginia would remain in the property of the Commonwealth 
and could be used as a common by its people for fishing and fowling. 
(Appendix 7). The "sand land" described in the 9rant to Malbone, 
et al. would seem to qualify as "the shores of the sea". Moreover, 
the Dawley tract was granted five years earlier, leaving unappropriated 
this strip of "sand land" along the ocean to the east. Perhaps 
this exclusion was made to comply with the 1873 statute. 
The "195 acre" Dawley grant may have been in violation of the 
1873 statute as a grant of the bed of Back Bay. The actual western 
boundary of the land in this tract follows the meanders of ~he 
shore of Back Bay. The boundary described in the grant however is 
a straight line just off the shore suggesting that a part of the bed 
of the bay has been included in the grant. 
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3. Ragged Island Tract 
The Ragged Island Tract is comprised of 800 acres of islands 
and marsh lands in Back Bay bounded on the east by East Bay; on 
the west by Red Head Bay; on the north by Little Narrows; and on 
the south by Cedar Island Gap. 
Original colonial grants to these lands totaled 801 acres: 
50 acres granted in 1690 to Joseph Perry; 250 acres granted in 
1733 to Edward Hack Mosely, Henry Holmes, and John Jemason; and 
551 acres granted in 1738 to Edward Hack Mosely. The early 
history of the title to Ragged Island is extremely fragmented, 
yet ownership of the 800 acres of Ragged Island remained with 
private individuals until the acquisition of these lands by the 
United States in 1938. 
Through a complicated series of devises and conveyances during 
the 1850's and 1860's, title to the 800 acres became uncertain and 
a suit was brought in 1889 to establish absolute title to this land. 
Ivers Adams v. Tenney, Woodbury, Knowlton and Franklin, Deed Book 60, 
page 620. Specific allegations in the suit are not clear because 
the records of the case cannot be located at the Virginia Beach 
Clerk's Office. The title examiner hired by the United States for 
purposes of the condemnation in 1938 also found these records to 
be missing. In the 1938 title report by the Senior Attorney for 
the Bureau of Biological Survey it was noted that although the suit 
was only prima facie evidence of the passage of title, "under the 
provisions of§ 6306 of the Virginia Code it would be impossible 
at this late day to disturb the title because of any defects 
arising out of that suit." Opinion and Report: Ragged Island 
Club, Inc., prepared by Ralph J. Luttrell, Senior Attorney, Bureau 
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of Biological Survey, March 22, 1938. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-113 
(1977 Repl. Vol.) (referred to by Mr. Luttrell as§ 6306) states: 
If a sale of property be made under a decree or order 
of a court, and such sale be confirmed, the title of the 
purchaser at such sale shall not be disturbed unless 
within twelve months from such confirmation, the sale 
be set aside by the trial court or an appeal be allowed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeals, and an order or decree 
be therein afterwards entered requiring such sale to 
be set aside but there may be restitution of the proceeds 
of sale to those entitled. 
The chancery court in the above mentioned suit of Adams v. 
Tenney, et al. ordered in 1891 that all lands in Ragged Island be 
sold by Special Commissioners at a public auction. The highest 
bidder was the Ragged Island Club, Inc. The Club therefore took 
absolute title to the 800 acres by virtue of Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-113 
(1977 Repl. Vol.) as there was never any motion to have the 
commissioners sale set aside. Some 47 years lab=r the Ragged 
Island Club, Inc. conveyed by general warranty deed the 800 acres 
of Ragged Island to the United States. 
The chain of title to Ragged Island presents, therefore, no 
basis for formulating a legal claim by the State of Virginia 
against the United States. 
4. Back Bay Gunning Club Tract 
The Back Bay Gunning Club Tract identifies all of the land 
within the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge which is located west 
of the Great Narrows. It consists of several irregular,predominantly 
marsh,islands. 
Land grants were made of this area as early as 1840. The 
majority of the land was patented to Luke Hill and Peter Land. 
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Title descended from these and other grantors until 1898 when 
Joseph Seelinger initiated his acquisition of the entire tract. 
By 1912 Seelinger had bought and sold all of the privately 
owned land in Back Bay west of the Great Narrows. In December of 
1899 he combined two tracts of land which were originally described 
as containing 582 acres and 100 acres. His description of these 
two tracts totaled 1,000 acres when he conveyed his remaining 
two tracts, of 77 acres and 140.2 acres, to the Club. 
The Gunning Club received a land grant from the State of 
Virginia in 1905. This involved an eight-acre marsh island 
adjacent to Deep Creek Cove near the western shore of Back Bay. 
(Appendix 1, Figure 6). The addition of this grant to the 
conveyances from Seelinger made the Club the sole owner of the 
land in this entire tract. 
In May of 1930, the Back Bay Gunning Club sold all of its 
interest in this area to Charles Mcveigh, who was associated with 
the Princess Anne Club. Mcveigh and the Princess Anne Club owned 
this tract at the time of the federal government's condemnation. 
According to the government's survey, this tract contained only 
663 acres. The discrepancy between the government's acreage total 
and the 1,225 acres conveyed by the Back Bay Gunning Club can be 
explained in part by Seelinger's actions. His conveyance of 1899 
to the Back Bay Gunning Club added over 300 acres to the actual total 
involved. Explanation of the remaining 250 acre discrepancy can 
be only supposition. This difference may be due to inaccuracies 
in land surveys made prior to 1840. 
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The potential problem with the Club's title involves the 
eight-acre grant in 1905. This was a grant of marsh land on the 
eastern shore of Virginia made after the 1888 statute possibly pre-
cluding such grants. According to that statute "all unappropriated 
marsh or meadow lands lying on the eastern shore of Virginia, 
which have remained ungranted, and which have been used as a 
common by the people ... shall remain ungranted." (Appendix 6). In light 
of this, the 1905 grant to the Back Bay Gunning Club may have been 
invalid. If so, the State of Virginia owned the eight acres 
at the time of the condemnation. (Appendix 1, Figure 6). 
C. FEDERAL PURCHASES AND CONDEMNATIONS 
In order to facilitate an understanding of the events leading 
up to and culminating in the condemnation of the Back Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge, major events have been set out chronologically 
below. A discussion of the key areas follows: 
1929 - Congress passed the Migratory Bird Conservation Act. 
1930 - The Virginia Legislature passed the first of three 
statutes relating to the acquisition of state lands. 
1936 - The Virginia Legislature passed the second consent-
related statute. 
12/17/1936 - The United States reached a purchase agreement with 
the Princess Anne Club for 4,479 acres in Back Bay. 
5/25/1937 - The United States Department of Agriculture Bureau of 
Biological Survey completed and certified a map of the 
Princess Anne Club Tracts showing state and colonial 
grants. State grants on the barrier beach are grossly 
in error. 
10/29/1937 - The Virginia Title and Mortgage Corporation certified 
a title search of the Princess Anne Club Tracts for the 
United States. 
- Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation of Richmond, 
Virginia issued two certificates of title to the United 
States for the Princess Anne Club Tracts. 
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12/22/1937 - A declaration of taking was filed by the United States 
for Princess Anne Club tract lands east of the Great 
Narrows, 3,113.52 acres. 
2/25/1938 - Title was vested in the United States to 3,113.52 
acres east of the Great Narrows by virtue of condemnation. 
3/1/1938 - A Purchase Agreement was made between the United States 
and the Ragged Island Club for 812 acres in Back Bay at 
a cost of $55,000. 
3/12/1938 - A letter from the U.S. Attorney General stated that the 
condemnation proceedings were conducted regularly and 
that title to the 3,113.52 acres was vested in the 
United States. 
3/31/1938 - The Virginia Legislature passed the third consent-
related statute. 
4/28/1938 - B. P. Holland executed a quit-claim deed to Charles 
Mcveigh, selling all interest he might have had to 
land within the area to be condemned. (He claimed 
an interest to land in the 663 acre tract.) 
5/16/1938 - In a letter to the U.S. Attorney in Richmond, the U.S. 
Attorney General relayed a recommendation that a final 
judgment of condemnation be had as a quit-claim deed 
from B. P. Holland would not clear up all technical 
difficulties with the title. 
5/17/1938 - Title was vested in the United States to Ragged Island 
by virtue of a deed of bargain and sale. 
8/18/1938 - Title was vested in the United States to land west of 
~he Great Narrows. (663.24 acres by virtue of 
condemnation.) 
11/4/1938 - A letter from the U.S. Attorney General stated that the 
condemnation proceedings were conducted regularly and 
that title to the 663.24 acres was vested in the United 
States. 
1939-1941 - Bailey v. Holland - B. P. Holland brought suit against 
the manager of the Refuge claiming an interest in the 
western portion of Back Bay. Holland did not prevail. 
10/16/1939 - Largely in response to claims such as Holland's the 
Presidential Proclamation was issued on this date 
redefining the boundaries of the Refuge and closing 
the waters therein. 
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When Congress passed the Migratory Bird Conservation 
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715 et seq. in 1929, it autho:rized the purchase 
or rental of areas for use as sanctuaries. The act requires 
explicit state consent to such acquisitions: 
[N]o deed or instrument of conveyance shall be 
accepted by the Secretary*** under this Act 
unless the State in which the area lies shall 
have consented by law to the acquisition by the 
United States of lands in that State. Id. at 
§ 715f. 
Allowing the state a right of consent in federal acquisitions 
by condemnation is a unique departure from the general rule and 
should be accorded great weight. 
In 1930 the General Assembly "assented" to the "provisions and 
requirements of the said Migratory Bird Conservation Act in so far 
as is necessary for the purpose of such conveyance, acceptance and 
acquisition .. II The Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries 
was "authorized, empowered and directed to do all things necessary 
to bring about the establishment of a bird sanctuary under the 
provisions of said act ... " (Emphasis added). Sess. Acts., 1930,Ch. 272. 
(Appendix 9). "Assent" has been held to differ from "consent". 
Consent implies some positive action while assent means mere 
passivity or submission which does not include consent. People v. 
Perez, 108 Cal. Rptr. 474, 510 P.2d 1026 (1973). A fair reading 
of the 1930 Act would seem to indicate it was qualified or 
conditional in nature. 
The apparent reserved "assent" given by the Virginia General 
Assembly in the 1930 Act contrasts markedly with language incorporated 
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by the statutes of at least four other states clearly giving 
state consent for the acquisition of land for the establishment 
of federal wildlife refuges. (Appendix 10). The uniformity of 
language found in the statutes of these states was due to efforts 
by the Department of Agriculture immediately following enactment 
of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act in 1929. The Department 
sent to each state a model draft of a consent provision which 
complied with the consent requirement of the Migratory Bird 
Conservation Act (16 u.s.c. § 715f). Pers. Comm., Walter Mccallister, 
Secretary, Migratory Bird Commission and Chief, Division-of 
Realty, Fish & Wildlife Service. Apparently most states adopted 
the model draft. Virginia did not. 
In 1936, two years prior to the condemnation, the General 
Assembly spoke again and more clearly on the issue of state 
consent to federal condemnation. 
The Act referred to as the 1936 Act (March 28, 1936) had 
as its preamble: "An Act to amend and re-enact Sections 18 and 
19 of the Code of Virginia relating to the acquisition of lands by 
the United States of America, ... " (Appendix 11). The amending of 
section 18 is irrelevant for the purposes of this report. The 1936 
Act, however, made several significant changes in section 19. 
First, the original section 19 began "The consent of the State 
is hereby given to the acquisition by the United States, " 
The same line appears in the 1936 act as "The conditional consent 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia is hereby given ... " 
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Second; the General Assembly in the original section 19 
consented to acquisitions by "purchase, lease, condemnation 
or otherwise ., . . " The 1936 Act read: " . by purchase, 
lease, or in cases where it is appropriate that the United States 
exercise the power of eminent domain, then by condemnation." 
Clearly, this change sought to lessen the nwnber of 
situations where the state would consent to the United States 
acquiring land in Virginia by condemnation. 
The third and perhaps most important change involved which lands 
may be taken. The General Assembly in the original section 19 
consented to land acquired" from any individual, body 
politic or corporate . for the conservation of the forests or 
natural resources of the State II The 1936 Act only named 
"land in Virginia from any individual, firm, association 
or private corporation . for the conservation of the forests 
or natural resources. II 
By dropping the term "body politic or corporate" which applied 
to municipalities, counties, and states, by any adding "private 
corporation(s)" the legislature made its intent clear. It sought 
to remove from the possibility of acquisition by the United States 
all state owned or public lands. 
Of course, when the United States seeks to condemn land, the 
state legislature may not burden or restrict it without federal 
consent to do so. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; United States v. 
Crary, 1 F. Supp. 406 (W.Do Va. 1932). In the case of the Migratory 
Bird Conservation Act ~uch consent was given. 
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Therefore, the 1936 enactment of the General Assembly could 
only have been addressed to acquisitions under federal act such 
as the Migratory Bird Conservation Act which specifically requires 
state consent. To assume otherwise would be to construe the state 
Act as unconstitutional on its face. And" ••. statutes should be 
construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality." 
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
On March 28, 1936 this state legislation came into force. 
The last sentence of this Act reads: "An emergency existing in that 
lands in Virginia are constantly being acquired by the United 
States, this act shall be in force from its passage." Nine months 
later on December 17, 1936 the federal government initiated 
procedures to acquire the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge. 
In 1938 after title had vested in the federal government for 
part of the Refuge, the General Assembly enacted a statute 
releasing "all rights and authority which the Commonwealth of 
Virginia may have or possess concerning wildlife except fish and 
oysters ... " Sess. Acts, 1938, Ch. 388, (Appendix 12) in the 
areas comprising the Refuge. The General Assembly specifically 
provided in section 2 of this enactment that the ceding of state 
jurisdiction was governed by section 19-a, Ch. 382 of the Acts of 
Assembly of 1936, the act giving consent for condemnation of lands 
other than those owned by the state. The 1938 Act,by specifically 
dealing with the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge condemnation 
and specifically ceding jurisdiction under the terms of the 1936 
statute, further supports the argument that state consent has to 
be measured by the 1936 statute of the General Assembly. Ch. 382, 
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Acts of Assembly, 1936. Measured by that statute, no consent 
was giyeil for the condemnation of state lands. 
There is evidence to suggest that, at the time of the 
condemnation, the United States knew or should have known that 
the State of Virginia had an interest in lands in Back Bay. 
In 1936 the United States and the Princess Anne Club engaged 
in a Purchase Agreement for the lands within the Princess Anne 
Club tract. Clause eight of that agreement provided that: 
... if the Attorney General determines that the 
title to said lands or any part thereof should be 
acquired by judicial proceedings, either to procure 
a safe title or to obtain title more quickly, or for 
other reason, then the compensation to be claimed by 
the owners ... shall be upon the basis of the 
purchase price herein provided. 
Unlike Ragged Island, which was purchased after such an agreement, 
the Princess Anne Club tract was later acquired by judicial 
proceedings (condemnation). In light of clause eight it would 
appear that the United States was not satisfied with the title 
to the Princess Anne Club tract. 
At first glance it would appear that the United States was 
concerned only with the interest of B. P. Holland in the Princess 
Anne Club tract. This however was not the case. At the time of 
the Refuge acquisition, Holland claimed an interE~st in some of 
the lands west of Great Narrows. In April of 1938, the 
Princess Anne Club in an effort to clear their title, received a 
quit-claim deed from B. P. Holland. The quit-claim conveyed all 
right, title and interest "in and to land in Princess Anne County, 
Virginia which the United States seeks to acquire for the 
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establishment of the Back Bay Migratory Waterfowl Project. 
and particularly . in and to the lands shown as tracts 
Numbers 39a-t, 39Aa, 39b, 39c and 39d ... " Book 192, page 229 -
Virginia Beach. Despite this deed the United States opted to 
condemn the land. 
Additional evidence suggesting that the United States was 
concerned with more than just Holland's claim can be found in a 
letter of May 1939 from the Assistant U.S. Attorney General 
to the U.S. Attorney in Richmond. The U.S. Attorney was informed 
that 
A copy of your letter was furnished the Solicitor, 
Department of Agriculture, for his information and 
his office has informally advised this Department 
they they feel that a verdict should be had in the 
proceedings determining compensation and a final 
judgment of condemnation entered based on the verdict 
as a quitclaim deed from B.P. Holland and his wife, 
Emily G. Holland, will not clear up all technical 
difficulties in the title. (Emphasis added). 
This letter does not explain just what the technical difficulties 
were. 
A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior to the 
U.S. Attorney General in June of 1940 provides further evidence of 
the existence of "technical difficulties." The letter, relating 
to the Holland v. Bailey case, 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942) gives 
a brief history of the Refuge condemnation. In so doing the writer 
mentioned that "[t]he Bureau of Biological Survey caused the land 
described within the option to be surveyed and had an abstract of 
title thereto made. The title, after examination, was found to be 
unsatisfactory." He did not explain why. Our examination of the 
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existing evidence and the abstract of title indicates that the only 
possible claimant to lands claimed by the Princess Anne Club 
was the State of Virginia. 
The evidence mentioned thus far suggests that the United 
States had knowledge of problems with the Princess Anne Club's 
title. The major piece of evidence which suggests that the United 
States should have known of the state's interest on the seaboard 
tract is also the most perplexing. (See the section on the 
title to the Princess Anne Club tracts, supra.) That evidence 
is a 1937 map labeled "Princess Anne Club Tracts" to which the 
Bureau of Biological Survey added the location of state and 
colonial grants. This map was contained in the official records 
of the condemnation. 
According to this map the entire seaboard tract was granted 
by the state from the northern to the southern boundaries of the 
Refugeo This representation is incorrect. The federal map 
misrepresents the location of the Malbone, et al. and Dawley 
tracts. 
First, it is clear from glancing at the map (Appendix 1, 
Figure 7) that the 82 acre Malbone, et al. tract is much larger 
than the 195 acre Dawley tract. Although these tracts contained 
much more than their originally alleged acreage, they were 
proportional in size. 
Second, the Malbone, et·al. and Dawley tracts (hereinafter 
Barbour tract) as placed on the federal map are located too far 
north on the seaboard tract. When Laura Kimball sold the seaboard 
tract to the Princess Anne Club, the southern boundary was a line 
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due east from the Little Narrows to the ocean. The Barbour 
tract used this line as its northern boundary. In other words the 
Barbour tract, as depicted on this map, has as its southern 
boundary what actually should be its northern boundary. Further 
evidence of the true location of these tracts can be found in the 
dividing line agreement between William Barbour and the Princess 
Anne Club of 1909, Deed Book 82, page 385, Virginia Beach. The 
line set there runs almost due east through the Little Narrows. 
The land which William Barbour eventually conveyed to the 
Princess Anne Club is 6,646 feet of ocean front from the dividing 
line south. The federal govermnent acknowledged the existence 
of this dividing line agreement on a "Tract Ownership Data" form 
made in reference to the purchase agreement with the Princess Anne 
Club in 1936. 
Third, the 1880 Dawley grant as depicted on this map 
encompassed Little Island. This cannot be correct since a chain 
of title to Little Island has been established back to a colonial 
grdnt, and at no time did it involve George Dawley. 
Fourth, the land which the map depicted as the "Barbour tract" 
was the same land owned by Jacob Travis. If the government map 
was correct, Jacob Travis would have held title to the same land 
granted by the state to Dawley and Malbone, et al. in the 1880's. 
Fifth, in a 1937 report labeled "Description of the Boundary 
of the Princess Anne Club Tract (39)" (contained in the condemnation 
records), the Assistant Cadastral Enqineer for the Bureau of 
Biological Survey described this Princess Anne Club tract as "Being 
all of the ... .Malbone, [et al.] 82 acre grant dated August 26, 
1885, [and1 the George W. Dawley 195 acre grant dated May 8, 1880 
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abstract 
(Emphasis added). From the United States' own title 
(prepared by Virginia Title and Mortgage Corp.), it is 
clear that the Princess Anne Club never acquired all of the 
Malbone, et al. and Dawley grants. Rather, they bought 
approximately one-half of the land involved .in each grant which 
would mean that these tracts would be cut approximately in half by 
the southern boundary of the Refuge. (Appendix 1, Figure 8). 
It is important to note that the area on this map labeled 
George Wo Dawley 195 acres and James Malbone 82 acres is the same 
area (excepting Little Island) which was wrongfully claimed by 
virtue of the Wood to Travis conveyance. This area was never 
granted by the State of Virginia. The map prepared by the Bureau 
of Biological Survey depicted these tracts incorrectly as to 
size and location with the result that these two tracts covered 
the exact area to which the State of Virginia has a claim. 
Reference is made in a letter dated February 10, 1938, from the 
Secretary of Agriculture to the U.S. Attorney General to the 
enclosure of two certificates of title issued by Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corporation of Richmond on October 29, 1937. To date 
the two certificates of title have not been located. They could not 
be found in the records of the Department of Interior, Department 
of Justice or the Regional Office of the Fish and Wildlife Service. 
The Regional Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, Robert 
Miller, has given Lawyers Title permission to make public the 
certificates of title,and Lawyers Title has agreed to search their 
records for the certificates. The certificates are significant in 
that they may help explain why the Princess Anne Club's title was 
deemed unsatisfactory. 
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V. POTENTIAL STATE CLAIMS 
A. SUBSTANTIVE THEORY 
1. Due Process of Law 
a) Claim to Compensation 
Eminent domain is the power of a sovereign to take property 
for public use without the owner's consent. Nichol's, The Law of 
Eminent Domain, (3d.ed.,1981), § 1.11. The powers which are 
vested in the federal government by the Constitution require for 
their exercise the acquisition of lands in all states. Kohl v. 
United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). However, the Constitution 
places limitations upon the federal government's acquisition of 
land through the Fifth Amendment: "No person . shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." The guaranty of the due process clause inures 
to the benefit of a state, Wyoming Ve United States, 255 U.S. 489 
(1921), while under the just compensation clause, the public 
property of a state is "private property," thereby disallowing any 
taking without compensation. Nahant v. United States, 136 F. 873 
(1st Cir. 1905); Wayne County v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 417 
(1918), aff'd., 252 U.S. 574 (1920). 
The title examination prepared for the United States for the 
purposes of condemnation in 1938 showed the questionable nature of 
the title held by the Princess Anne Club. That Virginia, and only 
Virginia, could make a legitimate claim against the Princess Anne 
Club is evident from these title records. That the United States 
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was aware or should have been aware of Virginia's claim in 1938 
is evident from an examination of condemnation records. Many 
references to the inadequacy of the title held by the Princess 
Anne Club exist within these records. Furthermore, the map 
prepared by the federal government is remarkable for either being 
an intentional masking of the Corrunonwealth's claims or for being 
an example of a higher order of negligence. Such evidence is 
thoroughly detailed in the section of this report on the 
Federal Condemnation, Section III, C, supra. 
Since the 1936 Acts of the Virginia Assembly specifically 
barred the acquisition of state-owned lands by the federal 
government, the United States was put on notice that it had no 
authority to acquire such lands. Where a potential state claim was 
apparent from the abstract of title, the United States as condemnor 
had the duty to give Virginia notice of this claim to allow Virginia 
the right to a hearing on compensation. The in rem nature of the 
condemnation proceeding could not relieve the United States of the 
necessity of providing notice to the state which had an interest 
in the land. As Circuit Judge Phillips noted in his opinion in the 
case of Fulcher v. United States, 287 F.2d 278, 287 (4th Cir. 1980), 
"it simply is no longer the law that the existence of in rem 
jurisdiction 'over the property itself' relieves of any necessity 
to give more than fictive notice to persons having interests in 
the property, in order to extinguish those interests." 
The constitutional standard requiring notice to interested 
parties was promulgated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 214 (1950). 
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An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded 
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all 
circumstances to apprise interested parties of the 
penden~y of the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections. 
The Supreme Court in the case of Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 
352 U.S. 112 (1956), followed the Mullane decision where it held 
that a landowner was entitled to notice of the condemnation pro-
ceedings against his property because he was a resident whose address 
was known to the condemnor. Notice by only newspaper publication 
was not sufficient to satisfy due process of law. Justice Black 
writing for the Court referred to the Mullane decision as 
establishing "the rule that, if feasible, notice must be reasonably 
calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and 
adversely affect their legally protected interest." Id. at 115. 
See, Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), (notice 
of a condemnation which was limited to newspaper publication 
where the diversion of a river would affect the owner's land, 
violated due process where name and address of owner was readily 
ascertainable.) 
Therefore, Fifth Amendment due process standards required that 
Virginia, as a claimant to the lands in Back Bay, be notified 
of the hearing on compensation where its interests would be 
adversely affected. Mere publication of notice was not sufficient 
notice to foreclose the State of Virginia's claims to Back Bay. 
If proper notice had been given in 1938 to the State of Virginia, 
it would have had the options to contest the proposed taking of 
state owned lands, to insist on compensation for the taking, or 
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merely to acquiesce in the taking of such state-owned lands by the 
federal government. However, the option belonged to~the State of 
Virginia to decide how best to control these lands in Back Bay and 
when the United States foreclosed Virginia's consideration of such 
options by not giving proper notice of its claim, the subsequent 
acquisition by the United States was violative of due process of 
law. 
b) Claim to Title 
Procedural defects in notice to condemnation proceedings 
give rise to actions seeking just compensation. The Fifth 
Amendment due process clause preserves for thE~ a9qrieved parties 
the right to a hearing on corq.pensation 6 but the _in rem nature of 
the proceeding effectively vests title in the condemner. See, 
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) 9 However, 
the Fourth Circuit in the case of United States v. Chatham, 323 
F.2d 95 (4th Cir~ 1963), held that notice which did not meet the 
standards of Mullane not only permitted a claim for just 
compensation but also permitted a claim to the title of the 
condemned land$ See also, United States v. 88.28 Acres of Land, 
608 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1979) (want of adequate notice allowed an 
attack on a government condemnation title in a quiet title action 
under § 2409a). 
In the Chatham case there was only notice by publication. 
Relying on Mullane, the court easily found a due process right to 
notice of a hearing on compensation and stated that "service by 
publication is not an adequate substitute for actual notice, when 
giving actual notice to identified parties is neither impossible, 
impractical, nor unreasonable." Chatham at 9B. But th€ go"<.rernment 
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in its published notice inaccurately described the land intended 
for condemnation. The court noted that "if each of the 
. [land owners] .•. with a lawyer at his elbow, had read the 
published notice, they would not have surmised that their lands 
were involved." Id. at 99. The court in Chatham concluded that 
notice was so deficient in its description of the land to be 
condemned, that it was "positively misleading". Therefore the 
condemnation court, whose jurisdiction was based solely on the 
defectively published notice, could not have acquired in rem 
jurisdiction over the land. Judge Haynsworth writing for the 
court in Chatham stated that "when no reader of the notice could 
have understood that the proceedings were directed to this land, 
it cannot be an adequate foundation for an exercise of an in rem 
jurisdiction over this land." Id. at 100. The Chatham court held 
that the absence of actual notice and the gross misdescription of 
the land in the published notice together were sufficient to 
find title remaining in the private owners of land. 
Though the facts in the Chatham case are not wholly comparable 
to that of the case at hand, the principles embodied in the court's 
decision are extremely pertinent. The federal government's 
misdescription of the lands rendered the condemnation court in 
Chatham without in rem jurisdiction over the proceeding. Similarly, 
it can be argued that the condemnation of state-owned lands in 
the present case, which were specifically reserved by the 1936 
Virginia Act of Assembly, rendered the court in the 1938 Back Bay 
condemnation without in rem jurisdiction over such state-owned lands. 
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As argued in Section IV A. 2. of this report, ir~!ra, state-owned 
lands could not be acquired by the federal government. The 
qualified consent by the State of Virginia bec~1e embodied in the· 
Migratory Bird Conservation Act, thereby limiting the United 
States' authority to acquire Refuge lands. Not only would any 
title acquired by the United States in state-·owned lands be void 
and inoperative, but also a declaration of taking of such lands 
would serve as an inadequate foundation for a.n exercise of in rem 
jurisdiction., 
Furthermore, the Chatham court found the entire condemnation 
procedure to have been a "gross deception" which formed the basis 
for divesting the United States of any claim to title. Similarly, 
in the case at hand, the federal government which should have at 
least been aware of Virginia's claim, pursued the condemnation 
in 1938 without any attempt to notify Virginia. And where 
potential questions may have arisen during the condemnation 
proceedings regarding Virginia 0 s claim as evident in the abstract 
of title, a map was drawn and included in the condemnation 
record which effectively concealed all of Virginia's claim on the 
seaboard tract. The descriptions were no less offensive here as 
in the Chatham case. 
Thus, the Fifth Amendment principles of due process as 
promulgated in Mullane and later refined by Chatham required the 
invalidation of any claim of title by the United States to state-
owned lands. Where the federal government, whether knowingly or 
unknowingly, had deceptively misled interested parties from 
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acquiring notice of condemnation proceedings against their land, 
the condemnation court lacked in rem jurisdiction and title to 
the land remained with the private owner. 
2. Statutory Interpretation/Section 715f Consent 
The authority with which lands are acquired for use by 
the United States derives entirely from Congress. Under an Act of 
Congress, 41 U.S.C. § 14, "no land shall be purchased on account 
of the United States, except under a law authorizing such purchase." 
Therefore, any conveyance of lands to the United States without 
Congressional approval is void and inoperative. United States v. 
Tichenor, 12 F. 415 (C.C.D. Ore. 1882). 
The authority for the acquisition of lands in Back Bay was 
derived from the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715 
et seq. Under§ 715f of the Act, consent of the state legislature 
to the federal acquisition of land is made an express condition 
of the United States' acceptance of such land. United States v. 
Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, rehearing den., 329 U.S. 834 (1946); 
Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967). 
The authority of the federal government to condemn lands for the 
purpose of establishing a wildlife refuge is therefore conditional 
on the consent of the state, and that consent may impose a limitation 
on the type of lands which may be acquired for a refuge. 
The testimony during the public hearings held in 1928 
prior to the passage of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act lend 
credence to this aspect of a state's right to give a qualified 
consent to the acquisition of land by the United States. The Act 
itself was viewed as a cooperative venture between the federal and 
state governments. As Paul Redington, Chief of the Office of 
50 
Biological Survey stated: "[The Act] ... provides for the 
greatest degree of cooperation between the Federal Government and 
the governments of several states in the administration and 
enforcement of regulations and laws for the protection of the 
migratory birds of America." Hearings before the Senate Committee 
on Agriculture and Forestry, s. 1271, Feb. 17, 1928. Not only did 
§ 715f require state consent by law to the provisions of the Act, 
but§ 715a required that either a ranking officer in charge of game 
lands within the state or the governor of the state be authorized 
representatives on the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission "for 
the purpose of noting on all questions relating to the acquisition, 
under this Act of areas in his State." The state representative 
on the Commission was there not only to foster a spirit of 
cooperation, but also to protect legitimate interests of the 
state in its lands. 
Another indication of the state's right to qualify 
consent is found in the hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce in 1961. The Committee approved a $105,000,000 
appropriation for the acquisition of lands under the Migratory 
Bird Conservation Act under which a proviso in the bill was added 
that no land could be acquired without the consent of the Governor 
or the appropriate state agency. Senator Magnuson commenting on 
the proviso, stated that "it is provided that they [the Federal 
Government and the State] must be in complete ag·reement as to the 
nature of the lands and the acreage involved." 74 Cong. Rec. 117111 
(May 28, 1961). Considering the cooperative purpose that was 
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envisioned between the Federal and State Governments at the 
inception of the Act and the continuing effort that is being made 
to maintain this atmosphere of cooperation, the consent clause 
which is embodied in the Act clearly permits the state to limit 
its consent to federal acquisition of land within the state. 
The 1936 Virginia Act of Assembly gave that qualifying 
consent to the United States allowing the acquisition of all land 
within the state with the exception of state-owned public lands. 
Therefore, since the enabling Migratory Bird Conservation Act 
limited the condemning power of the United States by the imposition 
of state consent, Virginia's exemption of state-owned lands from 
the purview of the Act rendered the federal government without 
authority to take such public lands of the state. As such, where 
the federal government holds such state lands, its title is void 
and inoperative. 
3. Taking Without Compensation 
The owner of property is constitutionally protected against 
any taking of, interference with, impact upon, or damage to his 
right to use, possess, or enjoy such property or his freedom to 
dispose of such property. This constitutional protection allows 
the affected owner to bring an action recovering his loss. Such 
action has been variously characterized as a suit in "inverse 
condemnation" or "reverse condemnation" or as an action based 
on a "de facto" or "conunon law" taking. Nichol's, The Law of Eminent 
Domain § 8 . 1 [ 4 ] , ( 3 d . ed . , 19 8 1 ) . 
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The concept of inverse condemnation is based on the idea 
that the defendant has exercised the power of eminent domain, but 
has not observed the legal processes to accomplish its purpose. 
Thus, physical interference with the use, possession, and enjoyment 
of property constitutes a de facto taking of the property for 
which there is a constitutional obligation to make compensation. 
Inverse condemnation is analogous to an action by a private 
landowner against another private individual or entity to recover 
title to or possession of property. The former property owner cannot 
compel return of property taken because of the eminent domain power 
of the condemner but the former owner does have a constitutional 
right to just compensation for what was taken. Nichol's at 
§ 8.1[4]. 
State-owned land is considered and treated the same as 
privately-owned land with regard to compensation. The United States 
cannot take state property under eminent domain proceedings without 
paying appropriate compensation to the state. The principle that 
state lands will be accorded the same considerations as priva_te 
lands was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893). 
The Court declared: 
While a grant from one government may supercede 
and abridge franchises and rights held at the will 
of its granter, it cannot abridge any property 
rights of a public character created by the 
authority of another sovereignty. No one would 
suppose that a franchise from the federal government 
to a corporation state or national to construct 
interstate roads or lines of travel, transportation, 
or communication, would authorize it to enter upon the 
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private property of an individual, and appropriate 
it without compensation. No matter how broad and 
comprehensive might be the terms in which the 
franchise was granted, it would be confessedly 
subordinate to the right of the individual not to 
be deprived of his property without just compensation. 
Andtheprinciple is the same when under the grant of a 
a franchise from the national government, a corporation 
assumes to enter upon property of a public nature 
belonging to a state. It would not be claimed, for 
instance, that under a franchise from Congress to 
construct and operate an interstate railroad the grantee 
thereof could enter upon the statehouse grounds of the 
state, and construct its depot there without paying the 
value of the property thus appropriated. Although the 
statehouse grounds be property devoted to public uses, 
it is property devoted to the public uses of the 
state, and property whose ownership and control is in 
the state, and it is not within the competency of the 
national government to dispossess the state of such 
control and use, or appropriate the same to its own 
benefit, or the benefit of any of its corporations 
or grantees without suitable compensation to the 
state. Id.at 100, 101. 
Regarding the payment of interest as part of just compensation, 
the general rule is that no interest is allowed on claims against 
the United States unless it consents. Jacobs v. United States, 
290 U.S. 13 (1933). However, this general rule does not apply 
to claims for just compensation for governmental taking. 
Just compensation is provided for in the Constitution 
and may not be taken away by statute. It involves making the 
owner whole, as if no taking had occurred. With this principle in 
mind, it follows that: 
Where the United States condemns and takes 
possession of land before ascertaining or 
paying compensation, the owner is not limited 
to the value of the property at the time of the 
taking; he is entitled to such addition as will 
produce the full equivalent of that value paid 
contemporaneously with the taking. Interest at a 
proper rate is a good measure by which to ascertain 
the amount so to be added. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. 
v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923). 
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This view is codified in 40 U.S.C. § 258a, a statute which 
allows the United States to take title and possession to land in 
advance of final judgment. The law allows interE~st at a rate of 
six percentum per annum on the amount finally awarded from the 
date of payment; "but interest shall not be allowed on so 
much thereof as shall have been paid into the court." 40 U.S.C. 
§ 258a. 
Regarding the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge condemnation, 
the government paid into the court the entire value of the land, 
thus apparently precluding the state from claiming interest due. 
There is, however, case law to suggest that if the United States 
is responsible for a delay in the distribution of the deposited 
fund, interest will be allowed. United States v .. Certain Lands in 
Suffolk County, N.Y., 270 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. N.Y. 1967). 
In Fulcher v. United States, 632 S.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1980), 
land was condemned under 40 U.S.C. § 258a, the same authorization 
for condemning the Back Bay lands. There, as in Back Bay, the United 
States failed to determine and notify the true owner of part of the 
land. The Court of Appeals ruled that if Fulcher could show his 
title to be good he would be entitled to the value of the land 
at the date of the taking plus interest from that date. 
4. Ejectment Against Individual (statute of limitations, 
concealment) 
Another possible approach would be to bring an ejectment action 
against the present manager of the Wildlife Refuge under a claim 
of better title. By naming the individual as the defendant instead 
of the United States one could presumably avoid the sovereign 
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immunity problem and thereby proceed without the constraints 
relating to such. This was the situation in United States v. Lee, 
106 U.S. 196 (1882), a cornerstone to present day sovereign 
immunity law. 
Although the law since Lee has been far from consistent, it 
now appears to be fairly certain that this approach is confined 
to a limited number of situations. A claim for specific relief 
against the officer as an individual can be maintained in two 
situations: one, when his actions are not within his statutory 
powers; two, when his actions, even if within his powers, are 
violative of the Constitution. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 
(1962). Hence, the Lee case has continuing validity only when a 
claim is made that the holding of the property constitutes an 
unconstitutional taking without just compensation. Id. 
It appears that the State of Virginia.'s situation fits neatly 
into the Lee exception. This would suggest that Virginia could 
maintain an ejectment action in a state court. There are, however, 
certain important caveats involved with this approach. Both the 
land in Lee and in Malone were acquired by the United States 
through a purchase. The Back Bay Wildlife Refuge was a condemnation. 
In a condemnation the United States acquires an indefeasible title 
leaving only a right to compensation to the claimants. In a 
purchase, the government's title is not as inclusive. 
An ejectment action would be filed in a state court. Undoubtedly, 
it would then be removed to a federal district court. If that court 
determines that the action is actually one which should be brought 
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under 28 U.S.C. 2409a (allowing the United States to be named as 
a defendant in an action in which it has an interest in real 
property) the state court will be deemed not to have had 
jurisdiction to hear the case. Since the district court's 
removal jurisdiction is only as good as the state's original 
jurisdiction, the case will be dismissed. McClellan v. Kimball, 
623 F.2d 83 {9th Cir. 1980). 
5. Negligence - Federal Tort Claims Act 
Through the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 
the United States waives its inununity from tort liability in 
certain cases. Under this section the federal district courts are 
given exclusive jurisdiction of claims against the United States 
for money damages, for injury or loss of property, or personal 
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission 
of any employee of the United States while acting within the scope 
of his employrnentn 
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) has been interpreted 
as only waiving immunity for negligence. Intentional torts (other 
than by law enforcement officials) are not seen as being within the 
scope of employment. Virgil v. United States, 293 R Supp. 1176 
(D.C. Col. 1968}; United States v. Drinkwater, 434 F. Supp. 457 
(E.D. Va. 1977). 
The FTCA presents a problem of limited retroactivity. That is, 
the Unitcj States has only waived immunity for claims accruing on 
and after January 1, 1945. This Act appears to eliminate any 
claim arising from the 1937-38 title searches. However, this 
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section has been interpreted as allowing claims for injuries 
suffered after 1945 which resulted from pre-negligence. In Re: 
Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation, 381 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. W. Va. 
1974). Thus, Virginia must demonstrate that injury did not 
occur until its claim was discovered, which was after 1945. 
6. Public Trust/Custom 
The public trust doctrine was recognized early in our United 
States case law as applied to land beneath navigable waters and 
the adjacent shoreline. The doctrine basically asserts that 
land under navigable waters is owned by the sovereign and is held 
in trust for the use and benefit of all the people. 
One of the basic premises of the public trust doctrine 
is that the sovereign acts as a trustee to protect and preserve 
the public trust lands. The Supreme Court has declared: 
The Federal government holds all public lands 
of the United States not as a monarch for private 
or prP.rogative purposes, but as a trustee for the 
benefit, use, and enjoyment of the sovereign 
people of the United States. 
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 
Van Bracklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 158 (1885). 
It has been argued that the concept of public trust imposes 
three types of restrictions on governmental authority: 
first, the property subject to the trust must not 
only be used for a public purpose, but it must be 
held available for use by the general public; 
second, the property may not be sold, even for a 
fair cash equivalent; and third, the property must 
be maintained for particular types of uses. The 
last claim is expressed in two ways. Either it is 
urged that the resource must be held available for 
certain traditional uses, such as navigation, recreation 
or fishery, or it is said that the uses which are made 
of the property must be in some sense related to the 
natural uses peculiar to that resource. J. Sax, 
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 
477 (1969). 
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The most famous public trust case is Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 287 (1892). At issue was the authority 
of the state legislature to convey a fee simple title to the rail-
road of over one thousand acres of commercial waterfront to a 
private railroad company. The Supreme Court ruled that conveyance 
of public trust lands was beyond the legislature's authority. The 
Court reasoned that a state has special regulatory obligations 
over its shorelands and these obligations are inconsistent with 
private ownership of the lands. 
The Virginia Supreme Court discussed public trust lands 
in a case involving the dumping by the City of Newport News of raw 
sewage into the James and Hampton Roads. 
The State holds its tidal waters and the lands 
thereunder as a trustee for the benefit of all the 
people of the State, to be administered as a trust 
for the enjoyment by them of their public rights 
therein, and subject to certain rights of user 
thereof which are common to all the people of the 
State. This trust is an active, continuing trust; 
and the trustee cannot be discharged or relieved 
from the duty of actively and continuously 
administering it and enforcing the corrunon rights 
of the people therein 'unless by revision of our 
Constitution'. Corrunonwealth v. NE~wport News, 158 
Va. 521, 533 (1932). 
Assuming that the State of Virginia consented to the 1938 
condemnation proceeding which established the Back Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge, an argument can be advanced that all of the land 
along the shores must remain in trust for the benefit of all 
Virginians and thus are not subject to conveyance. 
This theory of the public trust would in all probability 
be subsumed by the potentially far-reaching effects of the eminent 
domain theory. If presented with such an argument, the court is 
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likely to supercede any public trust arguments. 
An argument based on custom would in all probability suffer a 
similar fate. There are numerous requirements for the 
establishment of valid customary use. Among these are the 
necessities that customary uses be uninterupted and free from 
dispute. Given the circumstances surrounding the Back Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge, satisfying these two requirements may prove 
difficult. 
The primary weakness in making a custom argument is that 
only one state, Oregon, appears to have recognized it as a 
viable legal doctrine. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254,462 P. 2d 671 (1969). 
7. Implied Dedication 
Other state courts have relied on the doctrine of implied 
dedication to grant public recreational easements to dry sand 
beaches. See, Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964) and Gian v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal.3d 
29, 465 P.2d 50 (1962). In Virginia, the State Supreme Court 
will soon decide a case bearing on this doctrine. 
In Bradford v. The Nature Conservancy (Va. Supreme Court Record 
No. 79-1297), due for oral argument in the fall of 1981, the 
State of Virginia has joined plaintiff Bradford as a coparty. The 
dispute concerns title to Hog Island, which lies off the Eastern 
Shore of Virginia. The Nature Conservancy acquired title to the 
island several years ago and has since closed public access 
through their property. Specifically closed was a north-south 
road or "highway" located in the inter-tidal area along the beach, 
which had been used as a road for decades. The state is asserting 
a.claim to a substantial part of the beach property as a state commons 
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pursuant to the Virginia commons statutes of 1873 and 1888 
previously discussed in this report. 
Judge Wahab in Northampton County Circuit Court decided 
that the Atlantic Beach on Hog Island was subject to the public 
right to use the intertidal strip as a roadway. He observed that 
the common law principles of dedication have been recognized and 
applied in Virginia since 1871. Bradford Opinion at 38. Based 
on his reading of Virginia law, the judge then addressed 
the claims of the plaintiffs' concerning the Atlantic Beach of 
Hog Island: 
As the tide falls, the inter-tidal strip is left smooth 
and compacted providing a suitable surface upon which 
vehicles can travel at speeds comparable to those allowed 
on highways. From the earliest days of the island's 
history, the people have preferred the inter-tidal 
strip for their route of travel north or south 
when conditions permitted. 
As the court has found, the title to this 
strip remains in the Corrunonweal th of Virginia 
where grants were made after April 1, 1873. What-
ever title in the strip owners of land granted 
prior to that time may have, their estate is 
subservient to the public right to use the inter-
tidal strip as a roadway established by ancient 
and continuous use. Where the strip is owned by 
the Corcunonwealth, public use is subject to its 
control. Id. at 42. 
However, even if the doctrine of implied dedication is a 
viable argument in the Back Bay case, it may run counter to the 
commons argument and is certainly counter to the position taken 
by the Commonwealth in the Bradford v. Nature Conservancy appeals 
to the Virginia Supreme Court. The state has taken different sides 
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on some of the issues determined by Judge Wahab in Bradford. In 
fact, the case pending before the Virginia Supreme Court is 
actually two separate appeals which will be heard together before 
the Virginia court. 
In its opening brief in the case styled Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. The Nature Conservancy and Bradford, Record No. 79-1320, the 
state has taken the position that the trial court erred in holding 
that the beaches at Hog Island had become a public roadway. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 6. The brief written by Assistant Attorney 
General James E. Moore stated that: 
The trial court seems to have concluded that 
under 'principles of dedication or prescription 
historic public use of the beaches for travel 
created a public road .... This holding is 
contrary to decisions of this Court which hold that 
lands dedicated to one public use are not subject 
to other public or private prescriptive right .•. 
[Citations omitted]. 
The lower court's conclusion regarding the beach 
roadway is also contrary to clearly established public 
policy. The Acts of 1780, 1819 and 1873, 
respectively, reveal unambiguous legislative intent to 
preserve the shores for public fishing, fowling and 
hunting. Declaring the Atlantic beaches a roadway 
for vehicular travel seriously threatens the uses 
for which the Atlantic beaches have been statutorily 
reserved since 1780. Brief of Appellant, p. 6. 
The reply brief of the Conunonwealth is equally unwaivering in 
this position. The brief states that public fishing, fowling 
and hunting does not necessarily imply travel required to exercise 
these public rights. The state maintains the position that the 
Commonwealth's right to regulate the purported roadway does not cure 
the illegality of the purported roadway dedication. Reply Brief 
of Appellants, p. 3. 
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In view of this position concerning public roadways on 
Atlantic Beaches at Hog Island, the state may find it difficult 
politically if not legally to adopt a position directly opposite 
concerning the beaches at Back Bay. If the state argues that t~ 
entire ocean strand is a conunons, the state may :Eind that its 
own arguments in Commonwealth v. Bradford preclude it from arguing 
that it is a public easement. 
defenses.) 
8. Prescriptive Easement 
(See, the following discussion of 
A number of state courts have extended common law property 
doctrines to enable the public to acquire easements to private 
beach property. Unfortunately, none have gone so far as to grant 
prescriptive easements in state or federal lands. The Supreme 
Court of Florida recognized that prescriptive easements by the public 
could be acquired through recreational uses in City of Daytona Beach 
v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1974) and the Texas Supreme 
Court in Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1964) found that the requirements for a public prescriptive 
easement had been satisfied. 
These cases, while expanding the doctrine of prescriptive 
easements, involve the acquisition of property belonging to private 
parties. Research has revealed no cases which extend this doctrine 
of public prescriptive easements to property owned by the government. 
25 Am. Jur.2d Easements and Licenses, § 41 states that: 
In absence of an enabling statute an easement by 
prescription cannot be acquired in property be-
longing to the United States or a State. Furthermore, 
no prescriptive right can ordinarily be acquired 
in property affected with a public interest or 
dedicated to a public use. 
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Virginia cases on this point are in accord. Lynchburg v. 
Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 170 Va. 108 (1938); Virginia Hot Springs 
Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 432 (1919); Bellenot v. City of Richmond, 
108 Va. 314 (1908). 
Following this line of cases it makes no difference whether 
the state or the federal government owned the property in question. 
A prescriptive easement cannot be acquired in property owned by the 
state or the federal government. 
B. DEFENSES 
There are a number of defenses available to the Department of 
Interior if the state brings suit under the theories discussed 
above. 
1. Conflict of Law 
The Constitution of the United States (Art. III, § 2) provides 
that any suit to which the United States is a party must be brought 
in federal court. One of the first issues that may arise in 
fed~ral court is whether state or federal law should be applied 
in a suit of this type. This issue could have several facets. 
The question may arise as to whether state or federal common law 
rules should apply (e.g., in the areas of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel, eminent domain, etc.). 
The current approach to the choice-of-law question has its 
basis in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In that case, 
the Supreme Court removed the power of the federal courts to declare 
independent federal common law in deciding issues which would be 
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governed by state law in state courts. However, later cases have 
held that where the matter before the courts is closely related 
to a federal function, state law does not govern of its own force 
and the federal courts have the responsibility to fashion a federal 
rule to decide the issue. In the landmark case Clearfield Trust 
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) the court held that 
unless Congress has specified otherwise, a federal court has the 
option either to "adopt" state law as the content of the federal 
rule or to develop uniform federal law to resolve the question. 
In the Clearfield Trust case though, federal law was chosen as the 
applicable federal rule to govern an action against the United States 
on a federal check. 
In determining whether to adopt state law as the content of 
federal rule in the case before it, several prerequisites must 
be present. First the source of law applicable to the litigation 
must be federal. The source of applicable law is held to be 
federal when the question at issue is substantially related to a 
federal governmental function. See, Comment, Adopting State Law 
as the Federal .Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
823, 824 (1976). More specifically, a federal source has been 
found in cases involving activities stemming from a statute or 
the Constitution (Clearfield Trust, supra.); in cases involving a 
federal relationship (United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 
301 (1947)}; and in cases arising out of a particular federal program 
(United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,412 U.S. 580 (1973)). 
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The second prerequisite before reaching the adoption issue is 
that Congress must not have determined the choice-of-law issue. 
(See, e.g., Clearfield Trust, supra.) Taken together, these two 
prerequisites set the stage for the adoption choice by requiring 
the court to fashion a federal rule while leaving them free to base 
that rule on either federal or state law. 
Applying the guidelines in Clearfield Trust and later cases to 
the set of facts in the Back Bay controversy, it is likely that 
the court will formulate a federal rule. The dispute over Back 
Bay appears to be closely related to a federal function and there 
is no language in the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. 
§ 715, et seq.) determining choice-of-law. Thus, in attempting 
to discern whether the court will be likely to adopt Virginia state 
law as the federal rule, it should be helpful to focus on federal 
cases similar to the Back Bay controversy. 
In United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 
580 (1973), the Court was presented with a case involving the 
Migratory Bird Conservation Act. As was the case with the Back Bay 
National Wildlife Refuge, the United States acquired land parcels 
in Louisiana for a wildlife refuge pursuant to that Act. Mineral 
rights were reserved for a period of ten years to the Little Lake 
Misere Land Co. (hereinafter Little Lake) who were former owners. 
These rights were subject to extension if certain detailed explor-
ation and production cbnditions were met. Fee simple title was to 
vest in the United States after either event. The ten year period 
expired without the extension conditions being met. However, 
Little Lake continued to claim the mineral rights, relying on a 
Louisiana statute passed in 1940 after the refuge acquisition. The 
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statute, as applied retroactively, provided that mineral rights 
reserved in land conveyances to the United States would continue 
indefinitely. The government brought suit to quiet title. 
For the majority, Chief Justice Burger first acknowledged that 
disputes over real property are generally governed by state law. 
41 U.S. at 591-92. But following the guidelines in Clearfield 
Trust, he indicated that the source of law under these circumstances 
must be federal: " ... [T]his land acquisition ..• is one 
arising from and bearing heavily upon a federal regulatory 
program. Here, the choice-of-law task is a federal task for 
federal courts, as defined by Clearfield Trust .•.. " 412 U.S. 
at 592. 
The federal regulatory program referred to in Little Lake 
is the National Wildlife Refuge System established in accordance 
with the Migratory Bird Conservation Act. 
Chief Justice Burger further noted that the Migratory Bird 
Conservation Act is silent on the choice-of-law question, "[b]ut 
silence on that score in federal legislation is no reason for 
limiting the reach of federal law." Id. at 593. Once the Court 
establishes that the source of law is to be federal, the question 
becomes whether state law should be adopted as the federal rule. 
Here, the Court found that the Louisiana statute was not an 
appropriate standard for federal law: 
The Court in the past has been careful to state that 
even assuming in general terms the appropriateness 
of 'borrowing' state law, specific aberrant or 
hostile state rules do not provide appropriate standards 
for federal law .... 
To permit state abrogation of the explicit terms of a 
federal land acquisition would deal a serious blow to 
the congressional scheme contemplated by the Migratory 
Bird Conservation Act and indeed all other federal 
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land acquisition programs. These programs are national 
in scope. . . Certainty and finality are especially 
critical when, as here, the federal officials carrying 
out the mandate of Congress irrevocably commit 
scarce funds. Id. at 597. 
Conceivably, the district court could ignore any Virginia 
statute or common law rule it believed was aberrant or hostile 
to the federal program at Back Bay based on this passage in Little 
Lake. 
However, the Little Lake case can be distinguished by the fact 
that the Louisiana statute in Little Lake was passed after the 
federal land acquisition and also by the fact that the state had 
no real interest in the outcome of the suit. In Little Lake, the 
government argued that virtually without qualification, land 
acquisition agreements of the United States should be governed by 
federally created federal law. The court declined to resolve the 
case in such broad terms. In fact the Court states that, 
"Conceivably our conclusion might be influenced if Louisiana's Act 
as applied retroactively, served legitimate and important 
state interests the fulfillment of which Congress might have 
co~templated through application of state law." Id. at 599. 
Thus, the state can distinguish Little Lake by demonstrating 
that not only did the Virginia commons statutes precede the federal 
land acquisition at Back Bay, but a legitimate and important 
purpose has been served historically and would be served presently 
by a right-of-way through Back Bay. 
In addition, the state can demonstrate that the courts have 
traditionally deferred to state law in certain areas of the law. 
For example, in United States v. Yazell., 382 U.S. 341. (1966), 
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the Supreme Court held that state law has traditionally governed 
in the field of family and family-property arrangements, and in 
this case there was no reason to establish a federal rule. State 
law "should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear 
and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot 
be served consistently with respect for such state interest, will 
suffer major damage if the state law is applied." Id. at 507. 
A more recent example of deference to state law was in 
Georgia Power Co. v. Sauders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980). This 
case arose out of a dispute over the amount of compensation for 
property condemned by the utility company. The Fifth Circuit held 
that the source of the eminent domain power was clearly federal, 
following the guidelines of Clearfield Trust. As to whether state 
law should be adopted as the federal rule the court stated that 
"[b]asic considerations of federalism, as embodied in the Rules 
of Decision Act, prompt us to begin with the premise that state 
law should supply the federal rule unless there is an expression 
of legislative intent to the contrary or, failing that, a showing 
that state law conflicts significantly with any federal interests 
or policies present in this case." Id. at 1115-1116. The 
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) states that: 
The laws of the several states, except where the 
Constitution or treaties of the United States or 
Act of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall 
be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions 
in the courts of the United States, in cases where 
they apply. 
The court in Georgia Power reviewed several Supreme Court 
decisions and concluded that the cases evidence "a growing 
desire to minimize displacement of state law." Id. at 1118. 
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Moreover, the court acknowledged that even though there were important 
federal interests at stake in the suit, these interests were not 
sufficient to warrant displacement of state law on the issue 
of compensation in a private condemention proceeding. 
The problem, however, with the Georgia Power case and other 
recent decisions that adopt state law as the federal rule is that 
the majority of these cases involved with the rights and claims of 
private litigants. In fact the Georgia Power court notes that 
federal rules have been applied in federal condemnation cases 
where the United States is the party condemning and paying for the 
land. Id. at 1119. 
Research has revealed one other theory that may be advanced 
to support the state's contention that state law should govern 
the Back Bay dispute. In 1977, the Supreme Court rules in 
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 
429 U.S. 363 (1977), that disputed ownership of land underlying the 
Willamette River was governed solely by state law and not federal 
common law. While this case was based primarily on an interpretation 
of the equa~ footing doctrine, it may have precendentialvalue. 
The Court in Corvallis based its ruling on an 1845 Supreme Court 
decision, Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845). Pollard's 
Lessee held that the United States held land below the usual high 
water mark in trust for the new states and under the equal-footing 
doctrine each state as it joined the union enjoyed the absolute 
right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them for 
their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered 
by the Constitution. The Court concluded that: 
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First, The shores of navigable waters, and the 
soils under them, were not granted by the 
Constitution to the United States, but were 
reserved to the states respectively .... 
3 How. at 230. (Emphasis added). 
The Corvallis court then recounts subsequent decisions consistent 
with Pollard's Lessee. For example in Weber v. Harbor Commr's., 
18 Wall. at 65-66, the Court held that ". . . absolute property 
in, and dominion and sovereignty ove~ all soils under the tide 
waters within her limits passed to the state .•• "of California. 
And in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (11394) the Court stated: 
"The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the 
soil below high water mark, therefore, are governed by the laws 
of the several states, subject to the rights granted to the United 
States by the Constitution." 
Based on this line of cases, the Supreme Court chose to 
overrule a decision decided the same year as Little Lake, supra. 
In Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973) the Court 
had treated the equal footing doctrine as a source of federal cominon 
law and had applied federal rules to a disputed riverbed in Arizona. 
However, the court in Corvallis stated: 
This court has consistently held that state law 
governs issues relating this property, like other 
real property, unless some other principle of federal 
law requires a different result. Under our federal 
system, property ownership is not governed by a 
general federal law, but rather by the law of the 
several states. 'The great body of law in this 
country which controls acquisition, transmission, and 
transfer of property, and defines the rights of its 
owners in relation to the state or to private parties, 
is found in the statutes and decisions of the states.' 
Id. at 379 quoting Davis Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 
321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944). 
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Even though the Corvallis decision is encouraging for the 
state's position, there appears to be at least two problems. 
First, the Court held that state law governs, unless some other 
principle of federal law requires a different result. That principle 
arguably could be the one articulated in Little Lake. The second 
problem is stated in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (-1967). 
In that case the Court held that a dispute over title to lands 
owned by the federal government is governed by federal law: "The 
rule deals with waters that lap both the lands of the state and the 
boundaries of the international sea. This relationship, at this 
particular point of the marginal sea, is too close to the vital 
interest of the nation in its own boundaries to allow it to be 
governed by any law but the "supreme law of the land!" Id. at 293. 
At this point it is mere supposition whether the court will follow 
the rule as stated in Corvallis or as stated in Hughes. 
2. Res Judicata 
In an effort to relitigate access through Back Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge, the first hurdle will be the doctrine of res 
judicata. Under this doctrine, a valid, final judgment rendered 
on the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between 
the same parties or those in privity when based upon the same 
claim or demand. lB Moore's Federal Practice§ 0.405[1] (2d. ed. 
198 0) 
As stated in the U.S. Supreme Court: 
The general rule of res judicata applies to 
repetitious suits involving the-same cause of 
action. It rests upon considerations of 
economy of judicial time and public policy favoring 
the establishment of certainty in legal relations. 
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The rule provides that when a court of competent 
jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the 
merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit 
and their privies are thereafter bound 'not only as 
to every matter which was offered and received to 
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to 
any other admissible matter which might have been 
offered for that purpose.' Cromwell v. County of 
Sac., 94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L. Ed. 195. 
The judgment puts an end to the cause of action, 
which cannot again be brought into litigation 
between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent 
fraud or some other factor invalidating judgment. 
Com'r. v. Sunnen~ 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948). 
Bearing this rule in mind, the Department of Interior has 
already defended one attempt in court to re-open the beach at Back 
Bay to motorized traffic. Until the early 1970's the Refuge beach 
was open to automobile traffic, but on March 30, 1973 regulations 
severely curtailing beach traffic became effective. Immediately 
thereafter, a suit was filed seeking to keep the beach open. One 
bf the claims of the plaintiffs was that the Cnited States did not 
own the beach between high and low water pursuant to the Virginia 
commons statutes, and federal attempts to close the beach were 
thus invalid. The federal regulations were upheld and plaintiffs' 
claims dismissed in Coupland v. Morton, 7 ERC 1965 {1975) and 
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit,7 ERC 2127 (1975). 
If the state attempts to bring any of the same causes 
of action involving the commons statutes in the present action as 
were heard in Coupland, the Department of Interior may attempt to 
assert the doctrine of res judicata as a defense. However, the 
doctrine should not bar any future litigation by the state 
involving the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge. 
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On December 18, 1973, an interoffice memo was written at the 
Virginia Institute.of Marine Science (VIMS) by Theodore Smolen, 
an attorney who was conducting research on the Virginia commons 
statutes for VIMS. The memo indicated that the Commonwealth was 
joined as a party defendant on December 7, 1973 in Coupland v. Morton, 
~upra. In the last paragraph of this memo, Smolen states that 
"conversations with Mr. Baird (Assistant U.S. Attorney for Eastern 
District of Virginia) indicated that the interests of the United 
States and the Commonwealth in this matter were identical. However, 
I do not know if this is still the case. There seems to be no 
apparent ground for conflict between these parties in the matter." 
(Emphasis added). 
If Smolen's statement.is correct -- that the interests of 
the United States and the Commonwealth were identical or there 
was no conflict between the parties -- then res judicata should not 
be a bar to litigation on the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge 
between the United States and the Commonwealth. 
In researching the res judicata issue, a preliminary matter 
will be the question of conflict of law: whether the Virginia 
or Federal rules will apply which has been discussed in a 
preceeding section. 
As noted in Coupland v. Morton, supra_, the Commonwealth was 
joined as a co-defendant with the United States. In the event 
of future litigation Virginia would be the plaintiff. In this 
situation the black letter rule is well established: Parties to 
an action are not bound by a judgment, in a subsequent controversy 
with each other, unless they were adversary parties in the original 
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suit. Dobbins v. Barnes, 204 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1953); 
Livesay Industries, Inc. v. Livesay Window Co.·' 2 0 2 F. wd 3 7 8 
(5th Cir. 1953); Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Federal Express, 
136 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1943); Byrum v. Ames & Webb, Inc., 196 Va. 
597, 85 S.E. 2d 364 (1955); Natl. Bondholders Corp. v. Seaboard 
Citizens Natl. Bank of Norfolk, 110 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1940). 
SO C.J.S. Judgments§ 819 summarizes the rule as follows: 
"Estoppel ... is raised only between those who were adverse 
parties in the former suit and the judgment therein originally settles 
nothing as to the relative rights or liabilities of the co-plaintiffs 
or co-defendants inter sese, unless their hostile or conflicting 
claims were actually brought in issue, litigated and determined 
as by being put in issue by cross petition or separate and adverse 
answers or unless, under statute, the co-parties occupy adversary 
positions." 
In light of the general rule stated above, it would appear 
that the rule of res judicata does not apply to the present Back 
Bay action. However, the Fourth Circuit case, Nat'l. Bondholders 
Corp., supra, indicates that there are several exceptions to the 
general rule. They are: " ••. where co-parties do in fact 
occupy the attitude of adversaries ... or where some finding of 
fact is made in the first suit which is an essential element in a 
claim or action subsequently brought by one against the other." 
110 F.2d 138, 144. 
From the facts as established, it does not appear that the United 
States and the Commonwealth could be termed adversaries in 
Coupland v. Morton, supra. "The test is whether they make each other 
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adversaries by raising issues among themselves. If they do 
they are bound by the findings of the jury or the Court II 
Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 204 F. Supp. 
757,759 (N.D. Tenn. 1967). 
Turning to the Virginia rule in Byrum v. Aines & Webb, Inc., 
supra, the Virginia Supreme Court appears to be unmoved by the 
res judicata argument. In a prior case, the co-defendants had 
tried to show the other liable for damages. But the court said: 
"No issue was presented to the court for adjudication as between 
the two defendants. The evidence each offered in that suit was 
for the purpose of having adjudicated an issue between themselves." 
The court approved the rule stated in the Restatement of Judgments 
§ 82 (1942): "the rendition of a judgment in an action does not 
conclude parties to· the action who are not adversaries under 
the pleadings as to their right inter se upon matters which they 
did not litigate, or have an opportunity to litigate, between 
themselves." See also, Fowler v. Ainerican Federation of Tobacco 
Growers, Inc., 195 Va. 770, 80 S.E.2d 554 (1954). 
In sum, it is probable that the Commonwealth will not be barred 
from relitigating the Back Bay dispute based on the doctrine of 
res judicata. 
3. Collateral Estoppel 
A defense that is part of the doctrine of res judicata is that 
of collateral estoppel. Under the doctrine of res judic~ta a 
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties 
or their privies bars a second suit based on the sane cause of action. 
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel such a judgment precludes 
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relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the 
prior suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause 
of action as the second suit. Lawlor v. National Screen Service 
Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955). A more recent statement of the rule 
is that "once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by 
a court of competent jurisdiction that determination is conclusive 
in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving 
a party to the prior litigation." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 
147, 153 (1979). 
Thus, not only might the government attempt to collaterally 
estop the state from relitigating any issues determined in 
Coupland v. Morton, supra, but it could also a.ssert collateral 
estoppel as a defense based on Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, supra, 
if the Virginia Supreme Court's ruling is adverse to the state. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,should be an 
inappropriate defense concerning the issues litigated in Coupland v. 
Morton, supra. Since collateral estoppel is a part of the doctrine 
of res judicata, the same principles concerning coparties should 
apply: 
Estoppel ... is raised only between those who 
are adverse parties in the former suit and the 
judgment therein ordinarily settles nothing as to the 
relative rights or liabilities of the co-plaintiffs 
or codefendants inter sese, unless their hostile 
or conflicting claims were actually brought in issue, 
litigated and determined by being put in issue 
by cross petition or separate and adverse answers or 
unless, under statute, the coparties occupy adversary 
positions. SO C.J.S. Judgments§ 819. 
It should be noted that collateral estoppel is usually asserted 
when a party has litigated and lost and seeks to relitigate that 
issue. In the Coupland case, the state was joined as a defendant 
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with the Department of Interior and essentially won all issues. 
The state has not previously lost but could potentially change 
positions. (See, the section on doctrine of preclusion against 
inconsistent positions, infra.) 
Turning to the Bradford case, the question will be whether 
the government, who was not a party in that action, can 
collaterally estop the state from reasserting the commons issues 
if the ruling in the Virginia Supreme Court goes against the state. 
In the landmark case of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 
322 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court examined the scope of the 
doctrine. The court observed that collateral estoppel, like the 
related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting 
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with 
the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by 
preventing needless litigation. Id. at 326. The traditional rule 
was that the scope of collateral estoppel was limited by the doctrine 
of mutuality of parties. That is, the determination was not 
conclusive if the second action involved different parties, even 
though one of them had been a party to the first action and had 
unsuccessfully litigated the issue on that occasion. The rule was 
stated in Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912): 
"It is a principle of general elementary law that estoppel of a 
judgment must be mutual." This principle was based on the premise 
that it is somehow unfair to allow a party to use a prior judgment 
when he himself would not be so bound. Thus, the mutuality require-
ment allowed a party who had litigated and lost in a previous action 
an opportunity to relitigate identical issues with new parties. 
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. The rule was subject to many exceptions, but it remained 
universally recognized until 1942, when it was repudiated by the 
California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank o:E America, 19 Cal.2d 
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In an opinion written by Justice Traynor, 
the court said: 
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata 
(collateral estoppel) three questions are pertinent: 
was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication?" 19 Cal.2d at 809-810, 122 P.2d at 893. 
Bernhard gradually gained adherence from other courts, and in 1971, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University 
of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) abandoned the mutuality 
requirement, at least in cases where a patentee seeks to relitigate 
the validity of a patent after a federal court in a previous lawsuit 
has already declared it invalid. Under the influence of that 
decision, the Bernhard rule has gained wider acceptance and has 
now been adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 88 
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). 
The Blonder-Tongue and Bernhard cases both involved the 
defensive use of collateral estoppel -- a plaintiff was estopped 
from asserting a claim that he had previously litigated and lost 
against another defendant. 
If there was any question about the scope of the Court's 
ruling in Blonder-Tongue, or about the Court's attitude toward the 
mutuality rule, it was resolved in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 
439 U.S. 322 (1979). There the court granted federal courts 
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broad discretion in determining when the use of offensive 
collateral estoppel should be applied. In other words, in certain 
circumstances a defendant who has been sued and lost on a certain 
issue can be estopped from defending against another plaintiff on 
the identical issue (e.g., on the issue of negligence in a 
related series of tort cases). 
Thus, if the court applies the federal rule, it is conceivable 
that the Department of Interior could estop the state from 
relitigating claims based solely on the commons statutes if the 
ruling in Bradford goes against the state. However, if the court 
chooses to adopt the state rule on collateral estoppel, the 
trial judge might not allow the defensive use of collateral estoppel. 
As recently as November 26, 1980, the Virginia Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of collateral estoppel without mutuality. In 
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 272 S.E.2d 217 (1980), 
the court noted the modern trend to abrogate the mutuality require-
ment, but concluded not to abandon the mutuality rule when "offensive 
use of collateral estoppel is sought to be invoked in one of a 
series of damage suits arising from a common disaster." Id. at 220. 
By way of explanation the court stated that: In Virginia, the 
established rule is that collateral estoppel requires mutuality 
especially when the estoppel is used offensively." Id. at 219. 
• • • I 
This explanation leaves the court's position on defensive collateral 
estoppel somewhat unclear; however, the tenor of the opinion suggests 
that the court may be reluctant to abandon the mutuality requirement 
in virtually any case. The court merely defines collateral estoppel 
and cites ferebee v. Hungate, 192 Va. 32, 63 S.E.2d (1951) as 
80 
reference. There the court stated unequivocally that: "Judgements 
and decrees are conclusive evidence of facts only as between 
parties and privies to the litigation. And, in the case of a 
former adjudication set up on defense, it is no bar unless the 
parties to the first judgment are the same as those to the 
second proceeding." Id. at 63 S.E.2d 764. Thus if the Virginia 
Supreme Court's position is still grounded on Ferebee it appears 
that the mutuality requirement is still in place in Virginia. 
Even if the district court chooses to apply the federal rule 
on collateral estoppel the doctrine may still be inapplicable to 
a case involving state ownership in Back Bay. Before collateral 
estoppel can be invoked several conditions must be satisfied . 
.. 
First, the issue to be relitigated must be essentially the same 
as Lhe issue litigated in the previous action. Second, this issue 
must have been actually litigated in the prior action. Third, there 
must have been a determination in the first action precisely on 
this issue. Fourth, this determination must have been necessary 
to the judgment in the earlier action. See geinerally, Montana v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-157 (1979); F'. James, Civil 
Procedure§ 11.16-31 (2d ed. 1977); lB Moore's Federal Practice 
,1,1 0. 4 41-. 4 4 8 ( 2d ed. 19 8 0) • 
Determination of these conditions must await a decision in Bradford, 
but certainly the state can show that the disputes at Hog Island 
and at Back Bay are distinct geographically and legally. The Court 
in Montana stated that it must be shown that the "question expressly 
and definitely presented in this suit is the same as that definitely 
and actually litigated and adjudged'' in the prior litigation before 
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collateral estoppel can be invoked. Montana v. United States, 440 
U.S. at 157. And in Alderman v. Chrysler Corp., 480 F. Supp. 600 
(E .. D. Va. 1979); Judge Warriner for the Richmond Division stated 
that, "The'infallable' test of whether a second action involves 
the same cause of action as a prior suit is whether the facts 
essential to sustain the two suits are the same." Id. at 607. 
Moreover, the purpose of collateral estoppel (judicial 
economy and preventing _needless litigation) would not be served 
in this case because it would have been inappropriate to join the 
Department of Interior in the Bradford case. 
In addition, it can be argued that collateral estoppel in this 
situation is inappropriate because the doctrine should be limited 
to questions of fact or mixed law/fact. Many of the theories and 
issues pertinent to the state's interests in Back Bay are questions 
of law, and prior determinations of law have primarily precedential 
value. In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979) 
the Court cited United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924) 
for the proposition that: 
Where, for example, a court in deciding a case has 
enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a 
subsequent action upon a different demand are not 
estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise, 
merely because the parties are the same in both cases. 
But a fact, question, or right distinctly adjudged 
in the original action cannot be disputed in a 
subsequent action, even though the determination 
was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous 
application of the law. (Emphasis added). 
The Court in Montana concluded that when issues of law 
arise in successive actions involving unrelated subject matter, 
preclusion may be inappropriate. 440 U.S. at 162. This is the 
position taken by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 68.1 
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{Tert. Draft No. 4, 1977), and it is also the view of the Virginia 
Sunrcrne Court as expressed in Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 202 
S.E.2d 917 (1974): "Collateral estoppel is the preclusive effect 
impacting in a subsequent action based upon a collateral and 
different cause of action. In the subsequent action, the parties 
to the first action and their privies are precluded from litigating 
any issue of fact actually litigated and essential to a valid and 
final personal judgment in the first action." Id. at 671 
(Emphasis added). Citing the Restatement of Judgments§ 70 (1942) 
Restatement Supp. (Judgments§ 70 (1948), the court noted that 
collateral estoppel is applied with less rigor to issues of law. Id. 
The defense of collateral estoppel may be available to the 
federal government if the Bradford case is determined adversely to 
the state's interests, and especially if the court elects to follow 
the federal rule as enunciated in Blonder-Tongue. The state 
rule on the defensive use of collateral estoppel is less clear, but 
the Nor£olk and Western case appears to indicate that the rule of 
mutuality is still in effect in Virginia. It is a matter of 
conjecture how a federal court would interpret the Virginia rule. 
However, even if the mutuality rule is abandoned in the Back Bay 
case, the state can argue with authority that collateral estoppel 
is inappropriate in this case, because not only are the facts 
in Back Bay and Bradford quite different, but the Back Bay controversy 
involves questions of law which should preclude collateral estoppel. 
4. The Attorney General's Letter (Equitable Estoppel) 
In a letter addressed to the City of Virginia Beach dated 
October 18, 1971, the Attorney General of Virginia disclaimed any 
interest of the state in the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge. 
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In a suit by the state, the federal government may attempt 
to estop the state from asserting interest in the ~efuge based 
on the Attorney General's disclaimer. It does not appear, however, 
that it would preclude the state from asserting its interest in the 
Refuge. 
Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel a party may prevent 
another from changing position to the former's detriment. However, 
before the government can avail itself of this doctrine several 
prerequisites must be met. Pomeroy defines equitable estoppel as: 
... the effect of the voluntary conduct of a 
party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at 
law and in equity, from asserting rights which might 
perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, 
of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, 
who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and 
has been led ·thereby to change his position for the 
worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding 
right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy. 
3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 3804 (5th ed. 1941). 
In§ 805 Pomeroy lists six: essential elements and requisites 
in forming a defense of equitable estoppel. Among these, Pomeroy 
indicated that the conduct of the estopped party must be relied upon 
by the other party, and the relying party must in fact act upon the 
conduct in such a manner as to change his position for the worse. 
In other words, the party asserting the doctrine must rely on the 
conduct to his detriment. 
From all indications, it appears that the Department of Interior 
has not changed its position in any manner since the Attorney 
General's letter was written. Therefore, it appears well settled 
that the federal government could not estop the state on this 
basis. The government would have the burden to prove that it had 
changed its position so as to be injured by the state's conduct. 
See, Thomasson v. Walker, 168 Va. 247 (1937) for a statement of the 
rule. 84 
Even if the government could show detrimental reliance, the rule 
in Virginia is that the state is not subject to the laws of estoppel 
when acting in a governmental capacity. 7 Michie's Jurisprudence, 
Estoppel § 6 (1976). This rule was stated by the Virginia Supreme 
Court in Main v. Department of Highways, 2u6 Va .. 143, 142 S.E.2d 
524 (1965). " . [I]t is well settled that the doctrine of 
estoppel does not apply to the rights of a state when acting 
in its sovereign or governmental capacity. This is so because the 
legislature alone has the authority to dispose of or dispense with 
such rights." 142 S.E.2d at 529. 
Noting that the Main case is still the rule in Virginia, the 
court in Commonwealth ex reL Attorney General of Virginia v. 
Washington Gas __ Light Co., 269 S.E. 2d 820 (1980) acknowledged that 
the state's view on the doctrine may be a minority view and the recent 
trend appears to be to the contrary. The court agreed in theory 
to allow application of the doctrine in this particular case (the 
issue involved a revenue ruling issued by the State Corporation 
Commission). However, the court held that the party asserting 
estoppel could not prove by clear and unequivocal evidence that 
there was reliance on the state's representations. 
The federal rule on estoppel against the government (state, 
local or federal) is somewhat unclear. Without developing the 
case history of the federal rule, it should suffice to note that 
as recently as April 6, 1981, the Supreme Court addressed the 
estoppel issue. In Schweiker v. Hannen, U.S. , 101 S.Ct. 
1468 (1981), the Court held that the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) could not be estopped from insisting upon compliance with a 
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valid regulation even though a field representative of the SSA 
had given erroneous information to a claimant regarding the 
regulation. In his dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that 
the majority suggests that estoppel may be justified in some 
circumstances, yet, there are no indications where those 
circumstances are. The majority simply concludes in Schweiker 
that estoppel is not justified in this case. 
Certainly, the trend in both federal and state courts is toward 
relaxing the rigid rule of no estoppel against the government. 
See generally, K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies 
§ 17.01 et seq. (1976); Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 
79 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1979). Professor Davis argues that 
estoppel should be applied against governmental bodies "where justice 
and right require it" and observes that it is nowessentially the law. 
Davis, supra,§ 17.02. 
Regardless of wheth~r the district court turns to federal or 
state law, it seems likely that the federal government will not be 
able to estop the state based on the Attorney General's disclaimer. 
The federal government should be hard pressed to show detrimental 
reliance on the Attorney General's letter or that justice and right 
require estoppel. If the Supreme Court is still hesitant to apply 
estoppel to a federal agency where there was apparent reliance on 
governmental advice, as in Schweiker, the district court should 
refuse to estop the state where these was no reliance. 
5. Doctrine of Preclusion Against Inconsistent Positions 
Even where the facts will not permit the application of 
res judicata or collateral estoppel, it is recognized that a party 
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who has assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings 
may be estopped to assume a position inconsistent to the prior 
position if it is to the prejudice of the adverse party. 31 C.J.S., 
Estoppel § 117; 28 Am. Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver§ 68. This 
doctrine of preclusion against inconsistent positions is 
sometimes referred to as "judicial estoppel" and has frequently 
been recognized as a doctrine forbidding inconsistent positions, 
usually as to facts. Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510 
(3rd Cir. 1953); Thrasher v. Thrasher, 210 Va. 624, 172 S.E.2d 771. 
(1974). Accordingly, it has frequently been stated that where a 
party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and 
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter assume 
a position to the contrary simply because his interests have 
changed. 31 C.J. S., Estoppel § 117. 
Since in Coupland v. Morton the state took the position that 
it had no interest in the property in dispute at Back Bay, the 
government in subsequent litigation involving Back Bay might 
assert that this doctrine bars the state from now claiming an 
interest in the Back Bay property. However, this doctrine or rule 
of estoppel is subject to a number of limitations or exceptions. 
First of all, the rule against self-contradiction is said to 
rest on the policy of preserving the sanctity of oath, the orderly 
administration of justice and a regard for the dignity of judicial 
proceedings. lB Moore's Federal Practice, 0.405[8] (2d ed. 1980). 
The rationale for the doctrine seems to be based on a judicial 
reluctance to allow litigants to "play fast and loose" with the 
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courts according to the vicissitudes of self-interest. Scarano v. 
Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3rd Cir. 1953). In other words, 
the doctrine is based on the idea that a party should not be 
allowed to argue one set of facts to serve his interest and 
then to argue another set when his interest has changed. 
Accordingly, the doctrine may not be invoked where the position 
first assumed was taken as a result of ignorance or mistake, or 
through the fault _of the party claiming estoppel. 31 C.J.S. 
Estoppel § 117, lB Moore's Federal Practice, § 0.045[8] (2d ed. 
1980). 
Also, the basis for this doctrine has reference only to 
factual matters and not to contentions upon the law as applied 
to a given set of facts. 7 Michie's Jurisprudence, Estoppel § 34 
(1976). It has generally been accepted that the doctrine against 
prior inconsistent positions does not apply where the prior 
statement was merely an expression of opinion or legal conclusion. 
Sturm v. Baker, 150 U.S. 312 (1893}; Hartford Fire Inc. Co. v. 
Carter, 196 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1952}; U.S. v. Siegel, 472 F. Supp. 
440 (N.D. Ill. 1979); 7 Michie's Jurisprudence, Estoppel § 34 (1976); 
28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver§ 71. Thus, a person who has 
taken an erroneous position on a question of law is ordinarily not 
estopped from later taking the correct position, provided his 
adversary has suffered no harm or prejudice by reason of the change, 
7 Michie's Jurisprudence, Estoppel § 34 (1976). 
Certainly, the Attorney General's letter disclaiming any 
state interest in Back Bay was a legal opinion, which was the basis 
for the state's position in Coupland v. Morton, supr~, along with 
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the complex legal questions of state consent and state commons. 
Since the Department of Interior has in no way changed its position, 
it could show no harm or prejudice by reason of the change. There~ 
fore, the state should be able to demonstrate adequately that the 
doctrine against inconsistent statements is inapplicable in this 
case: the state is not changing the facts to suit its purposes, 
but has re-evaluated a complex set of legal theories and has 
discovered a state interest in land where before none was 
thought to exist. 
If this were not enough, there are several other limitations 
which should bar the use of this doctrine: 1) the principal of 
preclusion is not usually applied against the state or federal 
government. Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1132, 1136 (1946); 31 C.J.S. 
Estoppel, § 117; 2) the doctrine does not apply to a prior 
proceeding in which the parties are not the same; the Pittson Co. 
v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63 S.E.2d 34 (1951); Ferebee v. Hungate, 
192 Va. 32, 63 S.E.2d 761 (1951); and the same questions must be 
involved. In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 252 (10th Cir. 1975) cert. 
den. 423 U.S. 893; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum, 
99 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1938) cert. den. 305 U.S. 659; 3) the party 
invoking the estoppel must have relied on the first position, and 
so relying, have acted, or refrained from acting or have changed 
his position to his prejudice. 31 C.J.S. § 117 Estoppel; 4) there 
can be no estoppel based on such reliance where the party invoking 
it had knowledge equal or superior to that possessed by his 
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adversary and sufficient to protedl: him against being misled or 
relying on where he had a sufficient opportunity to acquire such 
knowledge. 31 C.J.S. § 117 Estoppel; 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and 
Waiver§ 70. 
These limitations should be satisfactory to render the doctrine 
of preclusion against inconsistent statements inapplicable. A 
district court in U.S. v. Siegel, 472 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill 1979) 
commented that: "The scope of judicial estoppel is narrow, 
particularly when applied to the Government, and generally, it 
pertains to statements made under oath in judicial proceedings and 
does not apply where the prior statement is merely an expression 
of opinion or legal conclusion." 
6. Jurisdiction - Statute of Limitations 
a) 28 U.S.C. § 1331 - Federal Question, now provides: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the 
matter in controversy ... arises under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, 
except that no ..• · sum or value shall be required 
in any action brought against the United States, any 
agency thereof, or any officer thereof in his official 
capacity. 
It appears that under one or more of the state's claims above, 
jurisdiction would be conferred by§ 1331. In at least one 
decision the United States Supreme Court has stated that 
"jurisdiction in this action to review a decision of the Secretary 
of Interior is clearly conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 133l{a). Andrus 
v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604 at 609 (1978). 
b) 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) - The Tucker Act 
Under any claim for money damages not sounding in tort, the 
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state must seek jurisdiction under this statute, which represents 
Congressional consent for such actions. The ~rucker Act confers 
on the district courts: 
Any other civil action or claim against the 
United States not exceeding $10,000 in amount, 
founded either upon the Constitution, or any 
Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive 
department, or upon any express or implied contract 
with the United States, or for liquidated or un-
liquidated damages not sounding in tort. 
The jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Claims. 
The purpose of the subsection is to permit a person with a 
relatively small claim against the United States to bring his 
action in the district of his residence rather than having to 
pursue it in Washington in the Court of Claims. Those with claims 
more than $10,000 must proceed in the Court of Claims. 
Actions founded upon the Constitution, which have been held to 
be within the Tucker Act jurisdiction include actions for 
unconstitutional taking of property. Section 1346(a) (2) applies 
to inverse condemnation suits by landowners. United States v. 21.54 
Acres of Land, 491 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wald, 
330 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1964). 
The primary problem in using either 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) or 
§ 1346(a) (2) is the statute of limitations provided in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401; (and in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 for the Court of Claims). 
Every civil action conunenced against the United 
States shall be barred unless the complaint is 
filed within six years after the right of action 
first accrues .... 
This general statute of limitations could be problematic 
because it is jurisdictional and may not be waived by the federal 
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goverruJlent, Crown Coat Front Co. vr~\United States, 275 F. Supp. 
10 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); and it is well settled that the statute is 
applicable to a claim by a state, California v. United States, 
132 F. Supp. 208 (C. Cl. 1955). 
In cases involving eminent domain, the claim accrues when the 
United States first takes possession of the land or files a 
declaration of taking, whichever is first. United States v. 
422,978 Sq. Ft. of Land in San Francisco, 445 F.2d 1180 (9th 
Cir. 1971). Since the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge was 
condemned in 1938, and access through the Refuge was closed in the 
early 1970's the statute under 28 u.s.c. §§ 2401(a), 2501 has run. 
However, the statute of limitations may be tolled. The 
federal courts have in some instances postponed the commencement 
of the statute where the claimant "did not know, and in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence could not learn that he had been 
injured by the government's allegedly wrongful conduct." United 
States v. Sams, 521 F.2d 421, 429 (3rd Cir. 1975). The standard 
of the Court of Claims appears to be tougher: The plaintiff must 
either show that the defendant has "concealed its acts with the 
result that plaintiff was unaware of their existence or [plaintiff] 
must show that its injury was 'inherently unknowable' at the 
accrual date. Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass'n. v. United States, 
373 F.2d 356, 359, cert. den. 389 U.S. 971 (C. Cl. 1967). 
c) 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) - Federal Tort Claims Act 
Under a theory of negligence, jurisdiction will be founded on 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Under this section the 
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United States has waived its inununity from tort liability and 
district courts are given exclusive jurisdiction of claims 
against the United States for money damages, for injury or 
loss of property, or personal injury or death, caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the United 
States while acting within the scope of his employment. 
The FTCA has been interpreted as only waiving inununity for 
negligence. Intentional torts (other than by law enforcement 
officials) are not seen as being within the scope of employment. 
Vigil v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1176 (D.C. Col. 1968); 
United States v. Drinkwater, 434 F. Supp. 457 (E:.D. Va. 1977). 
The FTCA presents a problem of limited retroactivity. 
That is, the United States has only waived immunity for claims 
accruing on and after January 1, 1945. This would, at first, appear 
to eliminate any claim arising from the 1937-38 title searches. 
This section, however, has been interpreted as a.llowing claims for 
injuries suffered after 1945 which resulted from pre-1945 
negligence. In re: Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation, 381 F. Supp. 
931 (S.D. W. Va. 1974). The task for the state, therefore, is to 
, show that injury did not occur until its claim was discovered after 
1945. 
The second major obstacle presented by the FTCA is a two year 
statute of limitations. A tort claim against the United States 
is barred unless it is presented to the appropriate agency within 
two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun 
within six months after final denial of the claim from that 
agency. 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b). The important point here is the 
date of accrual of the state's claim. 
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The Fourth Citcuit has announced~that a claim does not accrue 
until a claimant has had a "reasonable opportunity to discover all 
of the essential elements of a possible cause of action - duty, 
breach, causation, damages. II Bridgeford v. United States, 
550 F.2d 978, 981 (4th Cir. 1977). 
The United States Supreme Court has since questioned the 
requirement that the plaintiff must know that the injury was 
negligently inflicted before a claim accrues. They affirm, however, 
that he must at least know of the facts of his injury to begin 
the running of the statute. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 
111 (1979). Since the state did not even know of the facts of 
its injury until just recently, the two-year period should just 
now have begun to run. 
The state's argument will be based on the theory that the 
United States had a duty to find all persons who might have had 
an interest in the condemned land. The federal government attempted 
to meet this duty through a title search. The breach of that 
duty occurred in that the federal government (or its agents) did 
not perform the search with reasonable care. Evidence is 
available in the interpretation of the United States map of the 
"Princess Anne Club Tracts~ which shows the Dawley and Malbone, et al. 
grants in the wrong location. See discussion in this report, 
Section II~ C supra. 
d) 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f) - United States as Defendant,provides 
that: "The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction 
of civil actions under§ 2409(a) to quiet title to an estate in 
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real property in which an interest is claimed by the United 
States." This section, added in 1972, grants jurisdiction for 
an action to quiet title to land in which the United States has 
an interest. 
28 u.s.c. § 2409(a) waives sovereign immunity and allows 
the United States to be named a party defendant in a civil action 
to adjudicate a disputed title to land in which the United States 
claims an interest. 
Under§ 2409(a) a complaint is insufficient and will be 
dismissed unless it states with particularity the nature of 
plaintiff's right, title or interest, circumstances under which 
land was acquired, right, title or interest claimed by the 
United States, and the date on which the plaintiffs or their 
predecessors in interest knew or should have known of claims of 
the United States. Buchler v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 709 
(D.C. Cal. 1974), (See§ 2409a(c)). 
This section also contains a statute of limitations provision. 
§ 2409a(f) provides that: 
Any civil action under this section shall be 
barred unless it is commenced within 12 years of the 
date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be 
deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or 
his predecessor in interest knew or should have· 
known of the claim of the United States. 
In Gross v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1977), which was 
a suit against the Department of Interior to quiet title in 
certain Indian lands, the court held that the 12-year statute of 
limitations does not begin to run from the date the statute was 
enacted, but from the time when the claim of the United States 
became known or should have become known. This may become a major 
hurdle in disputing title to property at Back Bay since the interest 
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of the United States became known i~:1938 when the land was acquired. 
Questioning title to a right-of-way or to an area below high tide 
mark may be another question since the Refuge was not closed to 
traffic until 1972. At any rate, language in another opinion 
states that statutes which waive inununity of the United States from 
suit are to be construed strictly in favor of sovereign and claims 
are barred under§ 2409a where ownership claimed by the United 
States was well known. Hart v. United States, 585 F.2d 1280 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
Note also, that§ 2409a(b) apparently allows the United States 
to condemn any property if final determination under§ 2409a is ad-
verse to the United States: 
.. the United States nevertheless may retain 
such possession or control of the real property 
or of any part thereof as it may elect, upon 
payment to the person determined to be entitled 
thereto of an amount which upon such election 
the district court in the same action shall 
determine to be just compensation for such 
possession or control. 
Thus, even if the Cormnonwealth won the case, apparently the 
property could be recondemned under this statute. 
§ 125l(b) Original Jurisdiction provides that: 
The Supreme Court shall have original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction of: 
(2) All controversies between the United States and 
state; 
This statute provides the opportunity to invoke the original 
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. Caveat: a suit 
which need not be brought originally in Supreme Court can be 
• 
removed to federal court. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884). 
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But Cf. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 63 (1979) (California 
sought to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in 
suit to quiet title against Arizona and the United States). 
7. Laches 
The doctrine of laches cannot be applied against public 
rights. 30A C.J.S. Equity, § 114. By weight of authority the 
defense of laches is not available against the government, state 
or national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or to 
protect a public interest. U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67 
S.Ct. 1658 (1947); U.S. v. Summerlin, Fla., 310 U.S. 414, 60 S.Ct. 
1019 (1940); U.S. v. Ruby, 558 F.2d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 1978). 
8. Adverse Possession 
The federal government could attempt to use the doctrine of 
adverse possession in two ways. The first assertion could involve 
previous owners of tracts which now comprise the Back Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge. Title searches have revealed several tracts of 
land which were mysteriously expanded as they passed through the 
chain of title. This expansion results in an Emcroachment on state 
lands. When this evidence is presented it is probable that the 
federal government will attempt to show that title to state lands 
as acquired through adverse possession by thE? individual private 
landowners, and hence good title has passed to the United States. 
a) Adverse Possession by Individuals in Virginia. 
The general rule in Virginia is that there can be no adverse 
possession of land against the Commonwealth, and no time will bar 
her recovery. lA Michie's Jurisprudence, Adverse Possession§ 49 
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(1980). However, ~s early as 1798 th~~legislature created an 
.. I• 
exception to this rule.· As the Virginia Supreme Court observed 
in Seekright v. Lawson, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 458, 462 (1836): 
No time runs against the commonwealth, unless 
where the legislature has thought proper to 
allow.it. By the act of 1798 it is enacted that 
where lands have been settled for thirty years, and 
the taxes have been paid thereon within that 
period no entry or location thereon shall be valid, 
and the comrnonwealth's right to such lands is 
thereby relinquished. 
This Act (Sess. Acts of 1797-8, Ch. 10 § 1) has remained 
a continuous part of the Code of Virginia, and today can be 
found at§ 41.1-8 of the Code. The provision which required 
continuous settlement and payment of taxes for 30 years has 
gradually been reduced until at present the requirement is only 
five years. 
However, despite meeting the continuous settlement requirement, 
the claimant may still not be able to support a claim of title by 
adverse possession against the state in an area such as Back Bay. 
The 1798 Act required that lands be "settled" for thirty years be-
fore the Comrnonwealth relinquished its interests. It is unclear 
what the General Assembly meant by "settled", but a strong 
argument can be made that this entailed residential occupancy or 
cultivation of the land and not merely use for recreational purposes 
such as hunting or fowling. 
The requirements for adverse possession are that it must 
be actual, exclusive, hostile, open and notorious for the statutory 
period. lA.Michie's Jurisprudence, Adverse Possession§ 3 (1980) . 
. While the requirements for actual possession vary with the 
98 
situation of the land and the condition of the country, the 
typical mode of actual possession is by occupancy, residency, 
cultivation, enclosure or improvement. lA Michie's Jurisprudence, 
Adverse Possession, § 5 (1980). Therefore, if the meaning of 
"settled" in§ 41.1-8 is to be interpreted to be in consonance with 
the actual possession requirement, it can be argued that some 
showing of use other than recreational will be necessary. 
Therefore, the concept of settlement may encompass more than 
merely fishing and hunting activities by hunt clubs or 
individuals. 
Assuming that statutory requirements are met, a claim of 
title to land by adverse possession may still be inapplicable to 
lands within the Refuge. It appears that where wild and uncultivated 
land is involved an additional element may be required to claim 
title by adverse possession. In Taylor v. Burnsides, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 
166, 202 (1844), it was stated that "wild and uncultivated lands, 
completely in a state of nature, are not susceptible [to adverse 
possession]. An adversary possession of them can only be acquired 
by acts producing a change in their condition." This rule was 
followed in Harman v. Ratcliff, 93 Va. 249, 24 S.E. 1023 (1896) 
and in Austin v. Minor, 107 Va. 101, 57 S.E. 609 (1907) and in 
Leake v. Richardson, 199 Va. 967, 103 S.E.2d 227 (1958). In Leake 
the court stated: 
The character of the acts necessary to vest one with 
a title by adverse possession varies with the nature 
of the property involved, or in a state of nature, 
... the acts of ownership must indicate a change of 
condition, showing a notorious claim of title, 
accompanied by the essential elements of adverse 
possession. 199 Va. at 976. 
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Therefore,according to Virginia la1, a claim to wild lands 
by adverse possession at Back Bay would not be recognized unless 
evidence could be shown of some change in condition of the land. 
In cases deciding the question of title acquisition by 
adverse possession of land which has been used by the public 
during the period of adverse possession the courts generally have 
held that no title can be acquired if the public use indicates a 
claim of common or public right. 56 ALR 3d 1182, 1185 (1974). 
In Austin v. Minor, 107 Va. 101, 57 S.E. 609 (1907} the property 
in dispute was valuable only for hunting, fishing and trapping and 
to a limited extent as a range for hogs. Apparently many 
people hunted, fished and trapped upon the land. Though the court 
conceded that the claimant used the land more than anyone else, 
it ruled that the requirement of exclusive adverse possession 
had not been met. 
Accordingly, if parcels claimed by adverse possession at Back 
Bay have been used concurrently by the public as a corrunons for hunting 
and fishing, the adversary claim may not be recognized in court. 
Another line of cases exist that may be used to argue 
against claims of adverse possession at Back Bay. Apparently the 
rule in Virginia is that any property affected with a public 
interest or dedicated to a public use cannot be acquired by adverse 
possession. It was so held in Lynchburg v. C & O Ry. Co., 170 Va. 
108, 195 S.E. 510 (1938} concerning waters of a canal owned by the 
railroad; in Virginia Hot Springs Co.v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 
S.E. 326 (1919} involving a turnpike; and in Bellenot v. City of 
Richmond, 108 Va. 314, 61 S.E. 785 (1908} involving a public highway. 
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Following this line of cases, any of the parcels of land at Back 
Bay which were dedicated to public use as a conunons could not be 
acquired by adverse possession. 
The doctrine of adverse possession could also be used by the 
United States in its own right. The Back ~ay Refuge was acquired 
in 1938 and hence the federal government will probably claim 
that state interests in land at the Refuge have long been acquired 
by the United States through adverse possession under color of title. 
b) Adverse Possession by the United States. 
The second use of the doctrine could be by tne United States 
in its own right. Since the United States has held the Back Bay 
National Wildlife Refuge under color of title since 1938, it could 
assert title by virtue of adverse possession for the statutory 
period of 15 years. 
The issue will be whether the United States is allowed to 
acquire title by adverse possession against a state. The rule in 
Virginia and in other states is that title by prescription or adverse 
possession cannot be acquired against a state unless specifically 
permitted by statute. Seekright v. Lawson, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 458 
{1836); Tichanal v. Rol, 41 Va. (2 Prob.) 288 {1843); Shauks v. 
Lancaster, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 110 {1848); Levasser v. Washburn, 
52 Va. {11 Gratt.) 572 {1854); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession,§ Sb; 
Continental Oil Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 1.48 F. Supp. 411 
{D.C. Wyo. 1957). 
It does not appear that Va. Code Ann. § 41.1-8 {1981 Repl. Vol.) 
as discussed supr~, would apply to the United States. This section 
gives consent to adversely possess state lands by "persons" who 
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have settled continuously for five -y.ears and on which taxes have 
been paid. Neither is the United S~ates a person, or has it 
•• 
settled or has it paid taxes on the land in question. 
This rule is bolstered by the rule in Virginia and elsewhere 
that any property affected with a public interest or dedicated 
to a public use cannot be acquired by adverse possession. See, 
Lynchburg v. C. & o. Ry. Co., 170 Va. 108, 195 S.E. 510 (1938); 
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919); 
Bellenot v. City of Richmond, 108 Va. 314, 61 S.E. 785 (1908). 
Since part of the land at Back Bay was dedicated to public use as 
a commons, if the Virginia rule is applied, there should be no 
adverse posesssion. This general rule is supported by several 
federal courts: Adverse possession does not run against public 
property. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 389 F.2d 
252 (1968). Also, lands of a sovereign state may not be lost or 
taken from it by failure to assert its title, in absence of an 
agreement on the part of the state not to sue. Even with such an 
agreement, the state cannot lose such lands as it- holds for the 
public trust for a public purpose. United States v. Certain Lands 
in Town of Highlands, N.Y., 52 F. Supp. 540 (D.C. N.Y. 1944). 
Also a number of states have held that property held in trust 
for the people cannot be lost through adverse possession. 
People v. Shirokow, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, P.2d 859 (1980); Messersmith 
v. Mayor & Common Council of Riverdale, 223 Md. 323, 164 A.2d 523 
(1960); Smith v. People, 193 N.Y.S.2d 127, 9 A.2d 205 (1959). 
As demonstrated, the Virginia rule seems to be clear: title 
cannot be acquired by adverse possession against the state, and 
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further, any property dedicated to a public use cannot be acquired 
by adverse possession. It might also be argued that the federal 
rule on adverse possession is the same. See cases supra. The 
problem in arguing the federal rule is that in the .cases cited 
above, the United States was not the party asserting title by 
adverse possession against a state. 
In the one case that has been located where~ the United States 
was asserting adverse possession against a state, the state rule 
was not applied. In a case before the Court of Claims, People 
v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 208 (Ct. Cl. 19!;5), declared that 
the rule that no one can acquire title by adverse possession 
against a state does not apply to the United States. The Court 
of Claims held that: "The state could not ignore such occupancy. 
Possession by one under the authority of the United States is a 
peril against which the state must guard, just as an individual 
must guard against adverse possession by anyone~." Id. at 211. 
The rationale of this case appears to be based at least in 
part on a procedural limitation that is also a problem in the 
present controversy. The statute of limitations in 28 u.s.c. § 2501 
(§ 2401 applies to district courts) was held to bar actions by 
the state against the United States after six years. Thus, after 
that period, the state could not even sue the federal government 
much less defend title against an assertion of adverse possession. 
This decision can be criticized on several grounds. 
First, it effectively allows the United States to acquire title 
by adverse possession after only six years, since it has not 
consented to be sued after that period. Secondly, it appears 
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settled that a s"t;ate cannot acquire litle by adverse possession to 
land belonging to the United States. Note, 8 Ala. L. Rev. 408 
(1956). This Court of Claims case seems to have enunciated a 
strange rule that one governmental body can, in effect, acquire 
title by adverse possession against the other without the latter 
having the same power. There seems to be grounds for an 
equitable argument on this point. 
Also, this case can be distinguished if the statute of 
limitations can be tolled in the present action. Since the 
statute barred the suit in People v. United States, supra, the 
state rule was overcome. But in the present action, the state 
rule will be relevant. See section IV, B, 6. of this report for 
arguments for tolling the statute. 
A key issue here as with other arguments in this report will 
be whether the state rule or some federal rule should apply. The 
Court of Claims seemed to have formulated its own rule rejecting 
state law in People v. California yet the Conunonwealth can argue 
with authority that state law should govern in cases affecting title 
to lands. White v. Burnley, 61 U.S. 235 (1858); Beauregard v. New 
Orleans, 59 U.S. 497 (1856); Heirs of Burat v. Board of Levee Com'rs. 
of Orleans, 46 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1974); Mays v. Kirk, 414 F.2d 
131 (5th Cir. 1969); Jewell v. Davies, 192 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1951); 
and more specifically, the law of the state where the land lies 
controls on the question of adverse possession. Christ Church 
,. 
Pentecostal v. Richterberg, 334 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1964) cert. den. 
379 U.S. 1000. 
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VI. ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVES/ 
PETITION TO AMEND BACK BAY REGULA.TIONS 
Even though the chance for ultimate success is unlikely, 
one possible way to avoid some of the problems associated with 
litigation is to petition the Department of Interior to amend or 
repeal the regulations governing entry and use of the Refuge. 
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e), grants 
the right to petition a federal agency for the issuance, 
amendment, repeal of a rule promulgated by a fe?deral agency. 
Title 43 CFR §14.6(b) (1980) provides that any person may petition 
the Secretary of Interior for the issuance, amendment, or repeal 
of a rule concerning public lands. 
The section provides that the petition will be addressed to 
the Secretary of Interior or the U.S. Department of Interior. It 
must identify the rule requested to be repealed or provide the 
text of a proposed rule or amendment and include reasons in support 
of the petition. 
The current regulations governing public entry and use 
of the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge can bE~ found in 45 Fed. 
Reg. 35823-27 (May 28, 1980), as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 52391-92 
(Aug. 7, 1980). The current regulations allow only those 
individuals who were permanent residents of the Outer Banks area 
as of December 31, 1979, to qualify for commutE~r permits across 
the Refuge. 
The state will ultimately need to formulate the text of a 
proposed rule or amendment to the special regulation now effective 
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for Back Bay. ~his section will attempt to provide the background 
,. 
to the regulations currently in effect and to suggest several 
possible reasons in support of a petition to repeal or amend 
the Back Bay regulations. 
The current rule governing access and use of the Back Bay 
Refuge was published in the Federal Register May 28, 1980. A 
series of special regulations governing public access of the 
Refuge have been promulgated beginning January 12, 1972, when 
notice was first provided that the Refuge would be closed to 
unauthorized vehicles. The May 28 regulation provided that only 
permanent, full-time residents of the Outer Banks area who could 
furnish adequate proof of continuous residence, commencing prior 
to December 31, 1976 could qualify for motorized vehicle permits 
ac~oss the Refuge. This rule was to be effective through 
December 31, 1982. 
However, on July 25, 1980, President Carter signed into law 
Senate Bill 2382 (P.L. 96-315) which eased requirements for 
commuter permits through the Refuge. This law provided that any 
permanent resident of the Outer Banks area who showed adequate 
proof of residence prior to December 31, 1979, could qualify for 
a commuter permit through the Refuge. Consequently, this piece 
of legislative rulemaking was published in the Federal Register 
on August 7, 1980, as an amendment to the May 28, 1980 special 
regulation. 
Apparently, this Congressional action was initiated by Senator 
Jesse Helms of North Carolina. According to the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Division of Refuge Management, Senator Helms 
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petitioned the Service to amend the May 28 regulation at the 
request of Outer Banks constituents. When the Service refused, 
Senator Helms attached the amendment as a rider to Senate Bill 
2382 and obtained Congressional approval. This amenciment increased 
the number o'f permit holders from approximately 23 to 39. 
It may be advantageous for the state to explore a similar 
congressional course of action to achieve access through the 
Refuge. 
Any petition for amendment to the Back Bay rules must be 
amended so as to comply with statutory and regulatory provisions. 
The National Wildlife Refuge System, 50 CFR § :26 (1980) provides 
that public access, use and recreation is permitted in the National 
Wildlife Refuge System. Congressional authorization is codified 
in 16 U.S.C. § 668dd{d). 
In addition, the Refuge Recreation Act of 1962, 16 U.S.C. 460k, 
authorizes the Secretary of Interior to administer National 
Wildlife Refuges for public recreation as an appropriate 
incidental or secondary use only-to the extent that it is 
practicable and not inconsistent with the primary objective for 
which the area was ·established. The National Wildlife System, 
50 CFR § 25.ll{b) provides that: 
All national wildlife refuges are maintained for 
the primary purpose of developing a national program 
of wildlife and ecological conservation and 
rehabilitation. These refuges are established for 
the restoration, preservation, development and 
management of wildlife and wildlands habitat; for 
the protection and preservation of •~ndangered or 
threatened species and their habitat; and for the 
management of wildlife and wildlands to obtain the 
maximum benefits from these resourct:S. 
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In addition to the requirement ::t;.hat any recreational use 
;.· ·' 
... 
will not interfere with the primary _purpose for which the area 
was established, the Refuge Recreation Act also requires that 
funds be·available for the development, operation and maintenance 
of the permitted forms of recreation. 
Therefore, the petition to amend the Back Bay regulations 
must include supporting evidence that the use to be authorized by 
the proposed regulations will be in compliance with this Act. 
Further evidence to support the proposed regulation can be 
based on the fact that vehicular traffic is permitted in many other 
national refuges throughout the country. While each refuge is 
certainly unique, the assessment criteria for all refuges should 
be uniform. The May 28, 1980 special regulation for Back Bay states 
that the final determination on public access in Back Bay was 
based on consideration of among other things, Environmental Impact 
Statement 72-33 of December 29, 1972, Environmental Impact 
Assessment of May 4, 1976, and the Fish and Wildlife Service's 
Final Environmental Statement on the operation of the National 
Wildlife Refuge System published November 1976. 
While the environmental impact of vehicular traffic 
certainly varies from refuge to refuge, a number of special 
regulations were promulgated (or at least reviewed and updated) 
within the past year that permitted public access by motor vehicles 
into national refuges. Special regulations pursuant to 50 CFR 
Part 26 were published January 5, 1981, at 46 Fed. Reg. 913-917 
(1981) permitting motor vehicles into refuges in Rhode Island, 
Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, New York, New Jersey and 
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Pennsylvania. Vehicular traffic is also permitted in refuges in 
Wisconsin, 45 Fed. Reg. 85030 (1980), Oklahoma and Texas, 46 
Fed. Reg. 8525 (1981). However, it is difficult to ascertain 
precisely how limited this public access is judging solely from 
the rules published in the Federal Register. Vehicular traffic 
may be much more limited in practicality than it appears to be in 
the Federal Register. 
It may be especially significant to note that motor vehicles 
are permitted in Chincoteague National Wildlife Refuge at 
Chincoteague, Virginia. Vehicular traffic has been allowed there 
for some time; the current regulation now in effect can be found 
at 45 Fed. Reg. 22047 (1980). In part, these regulations 
provide that: 
Operation of registered motor vehicles and 
bicycles is permitted on designated access reads, 
trails, and parking areas .... Off-road 
travel by oversand vehicles is permitted only 
on designated routes within the public use 
areas. . Motorcycles and mopeds must 
remain on designated access roads and are not 
permitted in oversand vehicle areas ...• 
Forty-two (42) oversand vehicles are~ permitted 
in the oversand zone .... 
Since there is such a wide disparity in policy concerning 
public access and use of these two national wildlife refuges 
in Virginia, it may be valuable to investigate the rationale. 
The question might be raised: Does the environmental impact of 
vehicular traffic at each refuge differ enough to justify such 
disparities in the regulations? 
It must be recognized that past attitudes of the Department of 
Interior indicate that the petition will have little chance of 
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success. However, it should be nq:1;.ed that the Administrative 
Procedure Act, ·s U.S.C. § 702, prdtides for a court review of 
the decision. Section 702 provides that a person suffering legal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely effected by agency 
action is entitled to judicial review. Thus, not only may the 
state force the Department of Interior to take an official 
stance on the issue of access through the Refuge, but may obtain 
review of any denial of the petition. 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Evidence of the coast in the Back Bay area being a commons or 
fishery spans a period of approximately 300 years. Only during 
a brief period after the War Between the States from 1866-1873 
could commons have been conveyed by state grant. A survey filed 
for public record in the Princess Anne Courthouse in the late 
1860's depicts a commons 907 feet above the high water mark 
spanning the eastern part of what is now the Back Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge. There is no record of the state conveying this 
commons. In 1873 the state enacted legislation banning state grant 
of seashores except by special act or compact. The southern portion 
of the Refuge was conveyed by regular state granting procedures after 
that date. This grant could not have legally included the seashore 
of what is now the Refuge. In 1888 the state enacted similar 
legislation protecting marshes. This statute may have barred 
a 1905 grant of a marsh island in what is now the Refuge. 
In 1929 the federal Migratory Bird Conservation Act was passed 
and provided for the establishment of federal refuges subject to 
each state granting consent by law to the federal acquisition of 
land within a state. In 1930 Virginia by_ statute "assented" to the 
provisions of the federal Migratory Bird Conservation Act "as far 
as it necessary." In 1936 two years prior to the condemnation 
of the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge the state repealed an 
earlier law providing for federal condemnation of private, 
corporate, and state land. The Statute enacted as a replacement, 
consented only to the federal condemnation of private and corporate 
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land for natural resource purposes. 
In 1937 the federal government,after entering into a 
purchase agreement with the Princess Anne Club,became aware of 
title problems within the proposed Refuge and decided to condemn 
rather than purchase. A title examination conducted for the federal 
government showed an area of 1,046 acres to have questionable title. 
The state was the logical claimant to this land. Language in the 
chain of title of lands now within the Refuge speaks of commons 
and public lands. Of public record was·the 1869 survey depicting 
commons within the proposed Refuge. 
A: m:ap_ ~:s · prepared by the federal government for use in the condemnation 
suit which failed to reflect the 1869 conunons survey or seashores and 
marshes not subject to private ownership. The map also incorrectly 
superimposed much smaller grants of 82 acres and 195 acres to private 
parties over this 1,046 acre area subject to state claim. This gives 
the appearance that the proposed Refuge is entirely in private or 
corporate hands and therefore subject to condemnation under the 1936 
Virginia statute permitting only private and corporate condemnations. 
In 1938 the federal condemnation was accomplished and the state enacted 
a statute in that year ceding wildlife jurisdiction within the 
Refuge to the federal government and specifically made the grant of 
state jurisdiction associated with the Refuge subject to the 1936 
Virginia statute permitting federal condemnation of only private and 
corporate land. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia has arguable claims against the 
federal government regarding lands within the Back Bay National 
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Wildlife Refuge. At the time of the condemnation of the Back 
Bay National Wildlife Refuge the state appears to have held title to 
a large portion of the barrier beach now comprising the eastern 
part of the Refuge. The state may have also held title to a 
small marsh island in what is now the western p.art of the Refuge. 
Had the state consented to the condemnation of state land for the 
establishment of a Refuge as required under the federal Migratory 
Bird Conservation Act of 1929, and had the federal government, 
in a reasonable analysis of the title information, notified the 
state as a potential claimant in the condemnation proceedings, then 
possibly only the landward portion of the 1,046 acre tract would have 
been lawfully conveyed without a special act or compact from the 
General Assembly specifically providing for conveyance of 
seashores ungranted as of 1873 and marshes granted as of 1888. 
The state, however, never consented either generally or specifically 
to the condemnation of state lands under the federal Migratory 
Bird Conservation Act of 1929 thereby rendering the condemnation 
invalid as to state lands within the Refuge. 
If adequate state consent could be found the question of notice 
must be raised. A reasonable analysis of the title information would 
raise questions of state claims. It is a well supported principle that 
potential claimants in condemnation proceedings are entitled to the 
right of notice under principles of due process. It would seem that a 
potential claimant, particularly the state considering the special 
nature of these lands, should receive the required notice. Yet, 
Virginia was not accorded that right and was either negligently 
or deliberately misled as to its potential claims. 
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Although the defenses that could1ionfront the state in 
~;r:~·.·O:-
:::.·.:,,-
seeking redress --:res judicata, varf"6us types of estoppel, 
!aches and the statute of limitations -- appear surmountable, 
tolling the statute of limitations under federal statutes waiving 
sovereign immunity and permitting state claims warrant comment due 
to the special nature and history of the lands in question. 
The statute of limitations may be tolled if it is not reasonable 
to expect Virginia to have been aware of a claim to such lands. 
It is unreasonable to expect the state to have been aware of its 
claims within the Refuge in 1938 given the history and nature 
of these lands. Virginia suffers many of the same problems 
regarding commons and the loss of such lands as did Great Britain. 
Such lands are particularly subject to usurpation by private parties 
by being uninventoried, owned in common, important only locally, and 
generally misunderstood by those using them as to concept and 
associated legal rights. State claims to lands within the Back Bay 
National Wildlife Refuge were concealed from the state not only 
through a history of private usurpation but also by a relatively 
recent federal obfuscation. 
114 
APPENDIX 1 
The Evolution of Claims to Title 
To Lands Within the 
Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge 
Figures 1 through 9 
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BACK BAY 
Figure 1: Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge, 
Virginia Beach, Virginia. 
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Figure 2: Conunon Lands Evidenced By an 1869 Survey 
Recorded in the Princess Anne County Courthouse 
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Figure 3: Long Island Tract Before 1876 
118 
• 
t 
("\ 
BACK BAY 
Figure 4: Long Island Tract After 1876 
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BACK BAY 
-~ JAMES MAL BONE, G.W. LAND and S.S. LAND 
82 ACRES AUGUST 26, 1885 
Figure 5: Lands on the Shore of the Refuge Conveyed After 
the Statute of 1873 Prohibiting State Grants of 
the Shores of the Sea 
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BACK BAY 
• BACK BAY GUNNING CLUB 
8 ACRES, 1905 
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Figure 6: Marsh Lands Conveyed After the Statute of 1888 
Prohibiting the Grant of Marsh and Meadowlands 
on the eastern shore of Virginia 
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JAMES MAL BONE, G.W. LAND and S.S. LAND 
82 ACRES AUGUST 26, 1885 
GEORGE W. DAWLEY 
195 ACRES MAY 8, 1880 
Figure 7: Key Tract Placement According to a 1937 Map 
Prepared and Used By the Federal Government 
in the Condemnation Suit 
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Figure 8: Key Tract Placement Determined by Project Research 
According to Information in the Possession of the 
Federal Government Prior to the Condemnation 
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Figure 9: All Lands Subject to Potential State Claims 
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APPENDIX 2 
POSSIBLE REFERENCES TO COMMON RIGHTS 
SUPERIMPOSED OVER PRIVATE RIGHTS 
1. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 1, page 514, 1708, 
Edward Lamount to Lewis Conner, 1,775 acres [th~ entire 
Refuge beach] " .•• with all commons and common of pasture 
whatsoever • . . . " 
2. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 2, page 13, 1708, 
Thomas Griffin to J. Johnson, lying on the seaside in 
Princess Anne County .•. all "woods, rivers, profitts, 
commons of pasture, hereditaments. . 11 
3. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 5, page 112, 1736, 
Lewis Conner to George Smyth, "all that tract of land, sand 
bank and marshes containing 200 acres ... and bounding 
on the sea and bay .•. To have and to hold ... together 
with all and singular ye commons pastures woods underwoods 
wayes waters water courses easements profits ..•. " 
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APPENDIX 3 
POSSIBLE REFERENCES TO PUBLIC OR COMMON LANDS 
IN THE BACK BAY AREA 
1. Records of the Virginia Company, April 1621, House of Commons, 
"Act for the Freer Liberty of Fishing" set forths the public's 
right to freely use the sea shore in the Colony of Virginia 
for the purposes of taking, drying, salting and otherwise 
processing fish, gathering of wood for fuel and repairs, and 
for the purposes of performing any other activities necessary 
for the maintenance of their fishery operations. 
2. Records of the Virginia Company, June 1621, Letter from the 
Privy Council, "the people of the Colonies ... should have 
freedom of the shore for drying of their nets, and taking 
and saving of their fish and to have wood for their necessary 
. II 
uses .... 
3. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 3, page 401-402, 1721, 
Lewis Conner to Reodolphus Malbone, "on the sand banks near 
the table of pines on the eastern shore ... 250 acres ..• 
and running from ye said wading east a direct course to ye sand 
banks [sand dunes] of ye sea-shore and from thence along ye 
sea shore . . . . " 
4. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 5, page 38, 1735, 
Lewis Conner to John Gornto, one piece of sand banks and marsh 
containing 100 acres" ... bounding on ye said Back Bay and 
sea shore .... " 
5. Acts of Assembly, Chapter II, May 1780, "An Act to secure to 
the publick certain lands heretofore held as common." 
"Whereas, certain unappropriated lands on the bay, sea, and 
river shores, in th~ eastern parts of this commonwealth, have 
been heretofore reserved as a common to all the citizens 
thereof, ...• Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly, 
all unappropriated lands on the bay of Chesapeake, on the sea 
shore, or on the shores of any river or creek in the eastern parts 
of this commonwealth, which have remained ungranted by the former 
government, and which have been used as a common to all the good 
people thereof, shall be, and the same are hereby excepted [from 
grant] . " 
6. Clerk's Office Virginia Beach, Deed Book 22, page 154, 1790, 
John Gornto to Robert Trower, 50 acres of "marsh land, sand 
banks and flat lands ... bounding on the said back bay and 
sea shore .... " 
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7. Letter from R. E. Nash to Board of Public Works, 7/5/1870, 
"I have been authorized to purchase a small strip of sand land 
which I surveyed •.• " {Sand Bridge to North Carolina]. 
8. Letter from R. E. Nash to Board of Public Works, 7/9/1870, 
9. 
" ..• strip of sand land " 
Letter R. E. Nash to Board of Public ¥,rks, 7/28/1870, 
"I want to purchase for the Hon. Ben. Wood ••. a barren 
strip of sand land from sand Bridge to the N. Carolina line 
10. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 53, page 191, 1877, 
Governor of Virginia to Hartley, 50 acres of marshland known 
as Pasture Marsh bounded on the North, East and South by the 
Atlantic Beach and on the West by the waters of Back Bay. 
11. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 53, page 395, 1878, 
Governor of Virginia to Jacob Travis [North of the Refuge], 
bounded on the North by Forked Creek, on the East by said 
Creek and the Atlantic Beach. 
12. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 57, page 482, 1882, 
Governor of Virginia to Ellenton Newbern [South of the Refuge], 
" ... joining James Ewell on the North, the said Beach on the 
East other Public land on the South and the Waters of Back Bay 
on the West. • " 
13. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 56, page 197, 1883, 
George Dawley to James Knowlton, bounded on the east" •.. 
by the sand land lying between the above-named tract of land 
and the Atlantic Ocean." 
14. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 56, page 472, 1883 
Governor of Virginia to Burwell Ewell, [just south of 
Barbour tract], " .•• This land is bounded as follows: On 
the North by the lands of Otis Ewell, on the east by other 
public land ... and on the west by the waters of Back Bay. 
15. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 57, page 297, 1884, 
James A. Knowlton to Tenney and Woodbury, bounded on the 
east" .•• by the sand land lying between the above named 
tract of land and the Atlantic Ocean." 
16. Clerk's Office, Virginia Beach, Deed Book 69, page 327, 1900, 
Levi Woodbury et ux. to William Barbour [refers to "Dawley" 
tract], boundecr-o~the east" .•• by the sand land lying 
between the above named tract of land and the Atlantic Ocean." 
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APPENDIX 4· 
Chapter II, Acts of Assembly, 1780 
An act to secure to the publick certain lands heretofore 
held as conunon. 
1. WHEREAS certain unappropriated lands on the bay, sea, 
and river shores, in the eastern parts of this commonwealth, have 
been heretofore reserved as common to all the citizens thereof, 
and whereas by the act of general assembly entitled "An act for 
establishing a land office, and ascertaining the terms and manner 
of granting waste and unappropriated lands," no reservation 
thereof is made, but the same is now subject to be entered for and 
appropriated by any person or persons; whereby the benefits 
formerly derived to the publick therefrom, will be monopolized 
by a few individuals, and the poor laid under contribution for 
exercising the accustomed privilege of fishing: Be it therefore 
enacted by the General Assembly, That all unappropriated lands 
on the bay of Chesapeake, on the sea shore, or on the shores 
of any river or creek in the eastern parts of this commonwealth, 
which have remained ungranted by the former government, and 
which have been used as common to all the good people thereof, 
shall be, and the same are hereby excepted out of the said recited 
act, and no grant issued by the register of the land office for 
the same, either in consequence of any survey already made, or 
which may hereafter be made, shall be valid or effectual in law, 
to pass any estate or interest therein. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Chapter 333, Acts of Assembly, 1873 
Chap. 333 - An Act for the Preservation of Oysters and to 
Obtain Revenue for the Privilege of taking them Within the Waters 
of the Commonwealth. 
1. All the beds of the bays, rivers and creeks, and the shores 
of the sea within the jurisdiction of this commonwealth, and not 
conveyed by special grant or compact according to law, shall 
continue and remain the property of the commonwealth of Virginia, 
and may be used as a common by all the people of the state for 
the purpose of fishing and fowling, and of taking and catching 
oysters and other shellfish, subject to the reservations and 
restrictions hereinafter imposed. 
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APPENDIX 6·· 
Chapter 219, Acts of Assembly, 1888 
Chapter 219 -- An Act to prevent the granting of unappropriated 
marsh or meadow lands on the eastern shore of Virginia. 
1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That all 
unappropriated marsh or meadow lands lying on the eastern shore 
of Virginia, which have remained ungranted, and which have been 
used as a common by the people of this state, shall continue as 
such common, shall remain ungranted, and no land warrant located 
upon the same. That any of the people of this state may fish, 
fowl, or hunt on any such marsh or meadow lands. 
2. This act shall be in force from its passage. 
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APPENDIX 7 
Chapters 101 and 62, Virginia Code, 1873 
State property in oysters and in beds of water courses. 
1. All the beds of the bays, rivers aud creeks, and the 
shores of the sea within the jurisdiction of this commonwealth, 
and not conveyed by special grant or compact according to law, 
shall continue and remain the property of the commonwealth of 
Virginia, and may be used as a common by all the people of the 
sta~e, for the purpose of fishing and fowling, and of taking 
and catching oysters and other shell-fish, subject to the 
reservations and restrictions hereinafter imposed. 
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APPENDIX 8 
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Chapter .272, Acts of Assembly, 1930 
Chapter 272 -- An Act relating to the acceptance by the 
Commonwealth of Virginia of the provisions of the United States 
migratory bird conservation act. 
Whereas, the congress of the United States has passed an 
act entitled and commonly known as the "migratory bird conservation 
act".; and 
Whereas, it is provided in section seven of the act aforesaid that 
no conveyance of land as a bird sanctuary shall be accepted by the 
secretary of agriculture unless the State in which the area lies 
shall have consented by law to the acquisition by the United States 
of lands in that State; therefore, 
1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That 
the assent of the general assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
be and is hereby given to the provisions and requirements of the 
said migratory bird conservation act in so far as it necessary 
for the purposes of such conveyance, acceptance and acquisition 
herein referred to, and the commission of game and inland fisheries 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia is hereby authorized, empowered 
and directed to do all things necessary to bring about the 
establishment of a bird sanctuary under the provisions of said act 
in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and to cooperate to the fullest 
extent with the United States migratory bird conservation commission. 
2. An emergency existing, this act shall take effect and be in 
force from its passage. 
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APPENDIX 9 
Consent Legislation of States Other Than Virginia 
North Carolina 
§104-10. Migratory bird sanctuaries or other wildlife refuges. 
The United States is authorized to acquire by ·purchase, or by 
condemnation with adequate compensation, such lands in North 
Carolina as in the opinion of the federal government may be 
needed for the establishment of one or more mi9ratory bird 
sanctuaries or other wildlife refuges .... 
Utah 
23-21-6. Acquisition of lands by United States for migratory 
bird refuges. -- (1) The consent of the State of Utah is given 
to acquisition by the United States of such areas of land or water in 
the state, as the United States may deem necessary, by and with the 
consent of the county commission of the county where the land or 
water are located and after approval of application, subject to the 
laws of the State of Utah for water rights, for the establishment 
and maintenance of migratory waterfowl refuges in accordance with 
and for the purpose of the Act of Congress approved February 18, 
1929, entitled "Migratory Bird Conservation Act" .... 
Illinois 
§ 34. Consent for acquisition of land -- Service of process. 
Consent of the State of Illinois is given to the United States for 
the acquisition by purchase, gift or lease, of such areas of land 
or water, or of land and water in Illinois, as the United States 
may deem necessary for the establishment of preserves or reservations 
for migratory birds, in accordance with the Act of Congress approved 
February 18, 1929 •... 
Washington 
37.08.230 Migratory bird preserves. Consent of .the state of 
Washington is given to the acquisition by the United States by 
purchase, gift, devise, or lease of such areas of land or water, or 
of land and water, in the state of Washington, as the United States 
may deem necessary for the establishment of migratory-bird 
reservations in accordance with the act of congress approved February 
18, 1929 .... 
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APPENDIX 10 
Chapter 382, Acts of Assembly, 1936 
Chap. 382 -- An Act to amend and re-enact Sections 18 and 19 
of the Code of Virginia, relating to the acquisition of lands by 
the United States of America, so as to prescribe the rights, 
powers and jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the United 
States of America over and with respect to such lands, and persons 
and property thereon, and transactions, matters and things arising 
thereon, and to amend the Code of Virginia, by adding thereto two 
new sections numbered 19-a and 19-b, giving the conditional consent 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, to the acquisition by the United 
States of America of certain lands in Virginia, and prescribing the 
limitations imposed upon and the reservations incident to any 
transfer of such lands; and prescribing the respective jurisdictions 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia and of the United States of America 
over such lands, over persons and property thereon, and over any 
transactions, matters and things arising thereon; and to repeal 
certain acts pertaining to the same subject. 
Approved March 28, 1936 
1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, That 
sections eighteen and nineteen of the Code of Virginia be amended 
and re-enacted, and that the Code of Virginia be amended by adding 
thereto two new sections numbered nineteen-a and nineteen-b, so 
that the said amended and the said new sections shall read as 
follows: ... 
Section 19-a. The conditional consent of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia is hereby given to the acquisition by the United States, or 
under its authority, by purchase or lease, or in cases where it is 
appropriate that the United States exercise the power of eminent 
domain, then by condemnation, of any lands in Virginia from a!!Y_ 
individual, firm, association or private corporation, for soldiers' 
homes, for the conservation of the forests or natural resources, for 
the retirement from cultivation and utilization for other appropriate 
use of sub-marginal agricultural lands, for the improvement of 
rivers and harbors in or adjacent to the navigable waters of the 
United States, for public parks and for any other proper purpose of 
the government of the United States not embraced in section nineteen 
hereof. 
4. An emergency existing, in that lands in Virginia are 
constantly being acquired by the United States, this act will be in 
force from its passage. (Emphasis added). 
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APPENDIX 11 
Chapter 388, Acts of Assembly, 1938 
Chap. 388 -- An Act to release and transfer to the United Stat~s 
all rights and authority of the Conunonwealth of Virginia, concerning 
wild life, except fish and oysters, within a certain area of 8,950 
acres, more or less, in the county of Princess Anne, subject to 
certain limitations and reservations. 
Approved March 31, 1938 
Whereas, the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States of 
America, by virtue of the authority vested in him by an-act of 
Congress approved February eighteenth, nineteen hundred and twenty-
nine (45 Stat. 1222), as amended by an act of Congress approved 
June fifteenth, nineteen hundred and thirty-five (49 Stat. 378), 
is authorized to acquire areas of land and wate1~ for use as 
sanctuaries for migratory birds and other wild life; and 
Whereas, the Secretary of Agriculture has sE~lected, by and with 
the consent of the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission of the 
United States of America, for the establishment of a bird refuge 
and wild life sanctuary, certain land in Back Bay, Princess Anne 
County, Virginia; and, 
Whereas, the Conunission of Game and Inland Pisheries of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia has recommended that Virginia release and 
transfer to the United States all her rights concerning wild life, 
except fish and oysters, within said area, and certain waters 
abutting thereon and adjacent thereto, in order that the same may 
be developed as a migratory waterfowl refuge and wild life sanctuary 
under absolute Federal supervision and control; Now, Therefore, 
1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia as follows: 
Section 1. All rights and authority which the Commonwealth of 
Virginia may have or possess, concerning wild life, except fish and 
oysters, in that certain area of approximately eight thousand, nine 
hundred and fifty acres, more or less, of land and water in Back Bay, 
in the county of Princess Anne, are hereby released and transferred 
to the United States of America, which area will be set aside and 
established as a migratory refuge and wild life sanctuary by the 
President of the United States, and which is more particularly 
described as follows: • • • · 
Section 2. The jurisdiction ceded by this act shall be controlled 
and measured by the provisions of section nineteen-a of the Code of 
Virginia, as enacted into law by chapter three hundred and ei~hty-two 
of the Acts of the General Assembly of nineteen hundred and t irty-six, 
and shall not vest until the United States shall have acquired the 
title of record to the said lands within the above description, by 
purchase, condemnation, lease, or otherwise, and said area established 
as a migratory bird refuge by presidential proclamation. Nothing in 
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this act contained shall be construed as in any wise affecting the 
right of navigation in and over the.water in which said qualified 
wild life rights are herein released and transferred to the United 
States. (Emphasis added). 
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